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"The vilest deeds like poison weeds
Bloom well in prison-air:
It is only what is good in Man
That wastes and withers there:
PaleAnguish keeps the heavy gate
And the Warder is Despair.,,
INTRODUCTION

"Boxer X," a male inmate in Smith State Prison in Glennville,
Georgia, experienced sexual misconduct at the hands of a female
correctional officer.2 This abuse is similar to that endured by other male
inmates throughout the U.S. prison system. Between July and November 2003, the officer repeatedly ordered Boxer to "strip nude and
masturbate for her" while she watched through the food tray flap of
Boxer's cell door.3 She sometimes offered favors, such as bringing
more
S 4
hot food, in exchange for a chance to look at Boxer's genitals. On the
few occasions in which Boxer refused to participate, the officer threatened and then proceeded to file disciplinary reports against Boxer.5 In
his handwritten complaint to the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Georgia, Boxer wrote:
[T]he defendant was a correctional Officer Sergeant and I was
a prisoner. The defendant had the authority and power to
write false disciplinary reports against [me] . . . without any
problems and get away with it if I refused her sexual advances

1.

OSCAR WILDE, The Ballad of Reading Gaol, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF OSCAR
WILDE 195, 213 (Bobby Fong & Karl Beckson eds., Oxford University Press 2000)

2.
3.

(1897).
Boxer Xv. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1109 (1 th Cir. 2006).
Complaint at 6, Boxer X v. Harris, No. 603-147 (S.D. Ga. Filed Dec. 8, 2003),

granting implied motion to amend complaint, No. 603CV147, 2007 WL 1731436
(S.D. Ga. June 4, 2007).

4.

Id.at 5.

5.

See id.at 6 (alleging that the defendant falsely charged Boxer with "Insubordination,"
"Verbally Threatening," "Exposure/Exhibition," and "Failure to Follow Instructions"
for refusing to engage in sexual activities with the defendant). Boxer further alleged in
his complaint that he was innocent of all the charges, yet due to the fact that he was
"denied the right to call witnesses and present evidence," "[It]he right to request to
have charging officer (defendant) present," and "appeal forms," he was wrongfully
disciplined. Id.
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and refuse [sic] to engage in her sexplays. So I was like I had to
do it. 6

Despite the general public's ignorance of this issue of sexual misconduct perpetrated by female prison staff against male inmates, such
stories are
S 7remarkably familiar to those who study or work in the world
of prisons.
The Prison Rape Elimination Act ("PREA") of 2003 mandated
that the Bureau of Justice Statistics ("the Bureau") undertake new studies
of sexual violence in prisons.8 Accordingly, the Bureau released a report
in July 2006 revealing some groundbreaking data. Of the 344 substantiated allegations of staff-on-inmate sexual violence made in federal, state,

6.

Id. at 7. Also, Boxer asserted that the female staff perpetrator was not afraid that her
actions would be discovered by other prison officials:
I asked the defendant what if other officers or staff discover her engaged in
such unprofessional activity with me-the defendant stated to me that
most of the officers and staff here a[t] Smith State Prison have too much
dirt on their own hands to worry about the dirt that she do [sic]-and the
defendant stated to me that the thought of getting caught is the thrills [sic]
that turned her on the most.
Id. at 7.

7.

NAT'L INST. OF CORR., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STAFF PERSPECTIVES: SEXUAL VIO-

8.

17 (2006) [hereinafter STAFF PERSPECTIVES]
(conducting focus group interviews with prison officials regarding their knowledge of
prison sexual violence). The interviewees recognized that staff-on-inmate sexual misconduct perpetrated by both male and female staff occurs frequently. Id. One
respondent charged, "It's not just men-there have been female staff involved, too.
There have been more women involved than men." Id. at 18. A variety of such staff
sexual misconduct perpetrated by female staff against male inmates has been prosecuted in the past year. E.g., Former Prison Official Faces Charge of Sexual Conduct,
IDAHO STATESMAN, Sept. 15, 2006 (reporting that a female correctional officer at
Idaho's maximum security prison was arrested for engaging in sexual conduct with a
male inmate). These stories have made headlines in newspapers across the country in
past decades as well. E.g., Sean Kelly, GuardsAccused ofSex at Prison: Women Indicted
on Federal Counts, DENVER POST, July 12, 2002, at B-01 (reporting that two female
prison staff members, including a former prison manager and a former assistant to
the warden, were indicted for having sex with four male inmates); Scott Stephens, A
Story of Bar-CrossedLovers; Female Ex-Guard Accused of Having Sex With Prisoner,
PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 8, 1993, at 1B (telling the tale of a prison romance between a
former female prison official and male inmate that is now the basis for the criminal
prosecution of the female official).
Eg., ALLEN J. BECK & PAIGE M. HARRISON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
LENCE IN ADULT PRISONS & JAILS

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: SEXUAL VIOLENCE REPORTED BY CORRECTIONAL

AUTHORITIES, 2005, at 1 (2006) [hereinafter BUREAU SEXUAL VIOLENCE] (reporting

data from the second year of a "national survey of administrative records on sexual
violence in adult and juvenile correctional facilities").
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and private prisons9 in 2005, 67% of the overall victims were male inmates and 62% of the overall perpetrators were female staff.1" The data
contradicts the deeply entrenched perception that, in cross-gender interactions between prison staff and inmates, men are the perpetrators of
sexual violence and women are the victims.11 This gender stereotype has

9.

See generally Kenneth Kerle, Women in the American World ofJails: Inmates and Staff,
2 MARGINS 41, 41-42 (2002) (explaining the difference between prisons and jails as
one relating to the length of the inmates' sentences).
Prisons typically house inmates that have been convicted and are serving
sentences longer than a year [whereas] jail is where a person is brought upon
arrest.

... Historically, jails housed inmates sentenced up to a year; others
went into the state prison system. Due to crowding, many jails now hold sentenced inmates for a much longer time in part to relieve the congestion in the
state prison systems.
Id.

10. BuREAu

SEXUAL VIOLENCE,

supra note 8, at 9-10 (honing in on the numbers of staff-

on-inmate sexual misconduct incidents in prisons and jails, as well as the characteristics of the perpetrators and victims involved). The Bureau's data is considered more
extensive and reliable than correctional facilities' own administrative records. Id. at 2.
But see Podcast: Exposing Sexual Violence Behind Bars: The Implementation of the
Prison Rape Elimination Act, held by American University Washington College of
Law (Nov. 2, 2006), http://www.wcl.american.edu/podcast/audio/20061102_WCL_
PREA.mp3?rd=l (discounting, to some extent, the Bureau's data regarding female
perpetrators and male inmate victims of staff sexual misconduct as a predictable byproduct of the fact that men comprise the majority of prison inmates). In the discussion, panelist Brenda Smith, a preeminent scholar on prison rape and also a member
of the National Prison Rape Elimination Commission, linked the high numbers of
reported female staff perpetrators with the existence of a disproportionately large,
heterosexual, male inmate population:
Those numbers are [l surprising to people who [] don't work in the area,
but they're totally predictable for people who do. Because, you know, 93
percent of the U.S. prison population is male. So it would stand to reason
that there would be a higher number [of female staff perpetrators of staff
sexual misconduct], and also if you assume heterosexuality (assume that,
just for the minute), then 0 those numbers would be higher. But I think
that the other thing, too, when you look at the report, you also see that the
[] victimizers of female inmates are much more likely to be male staff.

11.

Id. However, there is some evidence of female staff sexually victimizing female inmates. E.g., Daskalea v. District of Columbia, 227 F.3d 433, 440 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(concerning female inmate "nude dancing" organized by female staff); Newby v. District of Columbia, 59 F. Supp. 2d 35, 35-36 (D.D.C. 1999) (involving female
inmate "strip-shows and exotic dancing" organized by female staff).
See discussion infra Part II (describing this gender stereotype and its historical development).
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influenced not only the minds of average Americans but has also permeated the legal response to prison rape. 2
Prison rape is fairly common'" and can take many forms, including
inmate-on-inmate sexual misconduct'4 and staff-on-inmate sexual misconduct,' 5 and all the various gender permutations within those two
categories. Currently, scholars are debating the nature of sexual misconduct between staff and inmates. Although the Bureau reported that
73.6% of the substantiated incidents of staff sexual misconduct in prisons in 2005 had a "romantic" nature, 6 the majority of scholars 17 and

12.
13.

14.

15.
16.

See discussion infra Part II (locating the gender stereotype at the root of the court
system's response to claims invoking the rights of men and women in prison).
See Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 (PREA), 42 U.S.C. % 15601-15609
(Supp. IV 2004) (publishing findings regarding prison rape in conjunction with the
PREA). Congress stated that at least 13% of inmates in the United States had experienced some form of sexual assault while in prison, based on conservative expert
estimations. 42 U.S.C. § 15601.
BUREAU SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra note 8, at 5 (recounting that there were over 1,900
reported allegations of inmate-on-inmate non-consensual sexual acts and abusive sexual contacts in state, federal, and private prisons and jails in 2005).
Id. (stating that there were 2,779 reported allegations of staff-on-inmate sexual misconduct and harassment in state, federal, and private prisons in 2005).
Id. at 9 (listing the "characteristics of substantiated incidents of staff sexual misconduct and harassment" in prisons and jails). The Bureau reported that the remaining
38% of staff sexual misconduct involved sexual harassment, unwanted touching, indecent exposure, pressure / abuse of power, or physical force. Id. These percentages
add up to more than 100% because multiple responses were allowed for each item in
the survey. Id.

17. See, e.g., Frank Green, Prison,JailStaff Cited in Halfof Sex Cases; Data Show That In
Va. and U.S., Female Workers Cited in Bulk of Offenses with Prison Inmates, RICHMOND

TIMES-DISPATCH,

August 27, 2006, at A-1 ("Meda Chesney-Lind, a

criminologist and professor of women's studies at the University of Hawaii . .. believes the word romantic is not appropriate. 'It's about power and abuse. It's not
about romance.'"). Along these lines, Brenda Smith, has written:
In any number of oppressive settings, there have been accounts of the powerless forming emotional bonds with those in power. During the period of
U.S. slavery, there were many accounts of male and female slaves bearing
children and having long-term relationships with their owners. The same is
true for men and women in custody .... However, prison authorities cannot be in the position of legitimizing relationships between staff and
inmates .... There is an inherent imbalance of power that the institution
relies upon for its legitimacy. Prisons depend on the fact that correctional
staffs interactions with inmates are based on achieving correctional goalssafety, security, discipline, and rehabilitation-rather than on furthering an
intimate or personal relationship.
Brenda V. Smith, Rethinking Prison Sex: Self-Expression and Safety, 15 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 185, 223-24 (2006) [hereinafter Smith, Rethinking Prison Sex].
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state legislatures18 argue that inmate consent is not acceptable as a defense to staff-on-inmate sexual misconduct.' 9 This position is based on
the presumption that the unequal power dynamics inherent in any custodial relationship make it impossible for an inmate to freely consent to
a romantic relationship with a staff member.20
18. See discussion infra Part I.A. (describing the various state statutory laws criminalizing
prison rape, as well as their policies on the use of consent as a defense).
19. This Article adopts the majority position by assuming that any sexual contact between a staff member and inmate always constitutes an abuse of authority and
therefore can never be considered consensual or "romantic." In light of this Article's
presumption of the invalidity of inmate consent, the reader should construe the
phrase "staff sexual misconduct" as used throughout this paper broadly to encompass
all related concepts, such as "sexual contact," "sexual violence," "sexual abuse," and
"prison rape." Each of these phrases is intended to reference the full range of possible
sexually coercive (i.e. non-consensual) conduct that can be committed by a prison
staff member against an inmate, and all of these terms will be used interchangeably.
See Robert W. Dumond, The Impact of PrisonerSexual Violence: Challenges ofImplementing Public Law 108-79 The Prison Rape EliminationAct of 2003, 32 J. LEGIS.
142, 144 (2006) (defining sexual violence in prison as a "complex continuum").
20. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DETERRING STAFF SEXUAL ABUSE OF FEDERAL INMATES 4 (Apr. 2005) [hereinafter DETERRING STAFF
SEXuAL ABUSE] (presenting the rationale underlying the legal doctrine that inmates
cannot consent to sexual acts with staff members). In particular, the report lists three
major factors that should invalidate inmate consent:
First, staff members and inmates are in inherendy unequal positions, and
inmates do not have the same ability as staff members to consent to a sexual relationship. Second, inmates may try to use sex to compromise staff
and obtain contraband or unauthorized privileges, which can compromise
the safety and security of the prison. Third, either knowingly or unknowingly, staff members who engage in sex with inmates may be exploiting
inmates' vulnerabilities or past sexual abuse.
Id. See also Craig Haney & Philip Zimbardo, The Past and Future of U.S. Prison Policy: Twenty-Five Years After the Stanford Prison Experiment, 53 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST
709, 709 (1998). The Stanford Prison Experiment involved placing "[o]therwise
emotionally strong college students" in a mock-prison environment. Id. The students
were randomly assigned to play the role of either prison staff member or inmate, and
the experimenters ultimately discovered that, when given authority over another human being, even the most "normal" people can "quickly internalize their ... role"
and take advantage of their power position by abusing those in custody. Id. The authors of this article, also the original experimenters, describe the extremely abusive
staff-inmate relationships that formed even just a few days into the experiment:
Many of these seemingly gentle and caring young men [chosen to play the
"guard" role], some of whom had described themselves as pacifists or Vietnam War "doves," soon began mistreating their peers and were indifferent
to the obvious suffering that their actions produced. Several of them devised sadistically inventive ways to harass and degrade the prisoners, and
none of the less actively cruel mock-guards ever intervened or complained
about the abuses they witnessed .... Our planned two-week experiment
had to be aborted after only six days because the experience dramatically
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Another source of debate about staff-on-inmate sexual misconduct
isthe questionable reliability of data on the numbers of inmate victims. 21 Much of the uncertainty in the field stems from the code of

silence that pervades prison culture and makes inmate victims hesitant
to report sexual misconduct to correctional authorities. This code of
silence is shaped by "fear of reprisal from perpetrators, . . personal embarrassment, and lack of trust in staff. '22 The code of silence can prove
even more oppressive to male inmates who have been victimized by female staff due to the pressures of hegemonic masculinity that exist in
prisons.23 In the prison gender order, a male inmate who has been victimized by a female staff member often feels compelled to keep that fact
hidden from other inmates and staff members.24 If the truth were to be

and painfully transformed most of the participants in ways we did not
anticipate, prepare for, or predict.

21.

22.

Id.This experiment demonstrates the complex psychological power struggle rooted in
the custodial relationship. In light of such a struggle, any attempts to parse out valid
from invalid inmate consent becomes a problematic task.
See James E. Robertson, A Clean Heart and Empty Head: The Supreme Court and
Sexual Terrorism in Prison, 81 N.C.L. REV. 433, 442 (2003) [hereinafter Robertson,
A Clean Heart] ("Commentators disagree over the number of victims [of prison rape].
Estimates range from one percent of the prison population to as high as twenty-eight
percent. In fact, a statistical fog surrounds prison rape ....").
BUREAU SEXUAL VIOLENCE,

supra note 8, at 2 (admitting that the code of silence has

contributed to some uncertainty regarding the accuracy of inmate reporting); see Olga
Giller, Patriarchy on Lockdown: Deliberate Indifference and Male Prison Rape, 10
CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 659, 662 (2004) (depicting the prison code as "a strict sys-

tem of behavior and order that governs prisoners' daily lives");

STOP PRISONER RAPE,

U.S. DETENTION FACILITIES: A Shadow Report to the U.N. Committee Against Torture 1, 11 (2006), available at http://
nicic.org/Library/021522 [hereinafter IN THE SHADOWS] (explaining that the "code
of silence" operates to "keep prisoner rape shrouded in secrecy both inside prisons
and jails and in society at large" by deterring prisoners from reporting sexual abuse,
and thereby acts as a "serious impediment to justice"). In light of the code of silence,
the Bureau is currently making efforts to develop new data-gathering methods that
will more accurately measure the incidence of sexual violence in correctional facilities.
BUREAU SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra note 8, at 2.
23. See Don Sabo et al., Gender and the Politics ofPunishment, in PRISON MASCULINITIES
3, 5 (Don Sabo et al., eds., 2001) [hereinafter Sabo, Gender and the Politics of Punishment] (defining hegemonic masculinity as "the prevailing, most lauded, idealized,
and valorized form of masculinity," which emphasizes "male dominance, heterosexism, whiteness, violence, and ruthless competition," and asserting that men's prisons
in particular are ripe settings for the "expression and reproduction of hegemonic masculinity"). Along these lines, prisons can be understood as "patriarchal institutions,"
for they demonstrate the "four earmarks" of patriarchy: homosociality, sex segregation, hierarchy, and violence. Id. at 7-8.
24. See Nancy Levit, Male Prisoners:Privacy, Suffering, and the Legal Construction ofMasIN THE SHADOWS: SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN

culinity, in

PRISON MASCULINITIES

93, (Don Sabo et al., eds., 2001).
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revealed, the inmate would risk losing his masculine image and being
perceived as even weaker than a25woman, the stereotypical embodiment
of vulnerability and submission.
In light of the Bureau's new data, the legal system must reconceptualize the current image of women in prison to include potential
26
aggressor status. Accordingly, this Article argues for the active prosecution of both female and male staff who engage in sexual misconduct
under a new standard that moves beyond the gender stereotype. Part I
describes the legal setting surrounding this issue. Part II explores the
legal manifestations of the pervasive gender stereotype mentioned above.
Part III recommends a new standard to apply in the prosecution of both
female and male staff perpetrators, based on lessons learned from the
prosecution of women for statutory rape outside of the prison context.
J]ust as women feel ashamed and humiliated by [sexual] harassment, men
may feel absolutely silenced .... Men may fear both that people will not
believe their claims and that people will believe their claims but will regard
them as effeminate. Because society equates being the target of sexual harassment with being something less than male, men may not want to admit
that they experienced sexual harassment.
Id. See also Sabo, Gender and the Politics of Punishment, supra note 23, at 10-11
("[T]he following core [code] commandments remain: Even if you do not feel tough
enough to cope, act as if you are. Suffer in silence. Never admit you are afraid. Whatever you see 'going down,' whether it is the brewing of pruno (prison-brewed
drinking alcohol), rape, or murder, do not get involved and do not say anything ....
Act hard and avoid any semblance of softness. Do not help the authorities in any
way. Do not trust anyone.").
25. See Siegmund Fred Fuchs, Male Sexual Assault: Issues of Arousal and Consent, 51
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 93, 94-96 (2004) (explaining how society ridicules men who come
forward to report assaults performed by women, particularly when the male victim
admits to having maintained an erection during his sexual assault, and further arguing that an erection under these circumstances should not be read as indicating
consent to engage in sexual activity); Kay L. Levine, No Penis, No Problem, 33
FORDHAM URnB. L.J. 357, 385 (2006) (discussing how men are just as constrained as
women by gender stereotypes and societal expectations, and as a result they are often
unable to recognize themselves as victims of sexual abuse perpetrated by women).
26. Other scholarly articles on the subject of prison rape have directed their efforts instead at redefining the image of men in prison to include potential victim status. See,
e.g., Cheryl Bell et al., Rape and Sexual Misconduct in the Prison System: Analyzing
America ' Most "Open" Secret, 18 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 195, 222 (1999) (demanding
that courts recognize that when men are victims of prison rape, their privacy rights
are implicated in a similar way that female inmates' privacy rights are); Giller, supra
note 22, at 660-64 (arguing that the "ultramasculine world" of prison prohibits any
recognition of the rape and victimization of male inmates); James E. Robertson,
Cruel and Unusual Punishment in United States Prisons: Sexual Harassment Among
Male Inmates, 36 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 2-19 (1999) [hereinafter Robertson, Cruel
and Unusua] (exposing the fact that sexual harassment is commonplace among male
inmates and attempting to create profiles of male inmate victims and victimizers).
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Finally, this Article concludes by assessing the potential outcomes of applying the new standard.
I.

THE U.S. LEGAL SETTING SURROUNDING

STAFF-ON-INMATE SEXUAL MISCONDUCT

As United States lawmakers on both the state and federal levels recognized the far-ranging, negative effects that staff-on-inmate sexual
misconduct has on both the inmate population and society at-large,27
they developed two new bodies of law: 1) statutory law that both criminalizes and attempts to prevent such misconduct; and 2) case law that
enables inmate victims to turn to the federal courts for vindication of
their Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Together, these legislative and judicial approaches create the
legal framework for the issue of staff-on-inmate sexual misconduct. As
such, they are the parameters within which any legal efforts to respond
to the problem of prison rape, including the new standard articulated in
Part III, are situated.
A. Statutory Law
1. Criminal Statutes
As of July 2006, all state and federal legislatures had enacted some
form of criminal statute prohibiting staff sexual misconduct with
inmates. 2' The majority of these statutes penalize uniformly all forms of
27. See Dumond, supra note 19, at 142-43 (detailing the development of official awareness regarding the problems associated with prison rape). Staff-on-inmate sexual
misconduct can have a severe physical and psychological impact on inmate victims
and can additionally endanger public health and safety outside of the prison walls. See
42 U.S.C. § 15601 (articulating findings that, inter alia, prison rape can contribute
to the spread of HIV/AIDS both inside and outside of prison, and it can also negatively impact the recidivism rate of inmate victims after release); see also Bell et al.,
supra note 26, at 208-11 (detailing the varied negative effects of prison rape, including psychological harms, physical harm, and harms to society); Giller, supra note 22,
at 687 ("[T]he risks associated with sexual assault in prison ... extend beyond prison
walls. Families, loved ones, and the general public are affected by the debilitating and
sometimes dangerous aftermath of prisoner rape.") (internal quotations omitted).
28. See NAT'L INST. OF CORR. & WASH. COLL. OF LAW PROJECT ON ADDRESSING PRISON
RAPE, FIFTY-STATE SURVEY OF CRIMINAL LAWS PROHIBITING SEXUAL ABUSE OF INDI-

VIDUALS IN CUSTODY (Dec. 2006),

available at http://nicic.org/Downloads/PDF/

Library/021387.pdf [hereinafter FIFTY-STATE SURVEY] (providing a chart of the statutes
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sexual misconduct, which is understood to encompass "sexual
penetration by a body part or an object, regardless of the sex of the
parties or what part of the body the penetration occurred, and sexual
touching or contact., 29 However, a few state statutes exclude coverage of
the more minor forms of sexual contact.3 O
Due to the unequal power dynamic inherent in the custodial relationship, twenty-five states and Congress 2 prohibit the use of consent
as a defense to staff sexual misconduct with inmates in their criminal
statutes. The penalties imposed on convicted prison staff also vary between the state and federal criminal statutes. Whereas all but three states
impose harsh penalties on staff perpetrators by defining some forms of
sexual misconduct as felonies,33 federal law merely defines staff-onpassed in every state relating to staff-on-inmate sexual abuse, as well as the potential
penalties and defenses for each).
29. NAT'L INST. OF CORR. & WASH. COLL. OF LAW PROJECT ON ADDRESSING PRISON
RAPE,

STATE

LAWS

PROHIBITING

SEXUAL

MISCONDUCT

WITH

INDIVIDUALS

IN

Uan. 2006), available at http://nicic.org/Downloads/PDF/
Library/021634.pdf [hereinafter CHECK-LIST]; see, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2241-2244
(West Supp. 2006) (creating federal criminal penalties for "aggravated sexual abuse,"
"sexual abuse," and "abusive sexual contact" between prison staff and inmates); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 130.00 (Consol. 2006) (defining sexual offenses broadly to include
sexual intercourse, oral sexual conduct or anal sexual conduct, sexual contact, and
forcible compulsion). See generally FIFTY-STATE SURVEY, supra note 28.
30. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6110 (2006) (defining sexual contact narrowly to
include "sexual intercourse, genital-genital, manual-anal, manual-genital, oral-genital,
anal-genital or oral-anal, between persons of the same or opposite sex," and to exclude other minor sexual contact). See generally CHECK-LIST, supra note 29; FIFTYCUSTODY: CHECK-LIST

STATE SURVEY,

supra note 28.

For examples of these states and their criminal statutes, see CHECK-LIST, supra note
29.
4
32. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 22 3(c) (excluding consent from the listed defenses); DETERRING
STAFF SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 20, at 4 ("According to federal law, all sexual relations between staff and inmates are considered abuse. Even if a sexual act would have
been considered consensual if it occurred outside of a prison, by statute it is criminal
sexual abuse when it occurs inside a prison.").
33. These three states are Iowa, Kentucky, and Maryland. See IowA CODE § 709.16(1)
(2003) ("An officer... of the department of corrections.., who engages in a sex act
with an individual committed to the custody of the department of corrections ...
commits an aggravated misdemeanor."); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.120(2) (2006)
("Sexual abuse in the second degree is a Class A misdemeanor."); MD. CODE ANN.,
[Crim. Law] § 3-314(d) (2006) ("A person who violates this section is guilty of a
misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 3 years or
a fine not exceeding $3,000 or both."). See generally CHECK-LIsT, supra note 29;
FIFTY-STATE SURVEY, supra note 28. Furthermore, Arizona, Delaware, and Nevada
impose criminal sanctions not only on staff but also on inmates who participate in
staff-on-inmate sexual misconduct. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1419(B) (2006)
("A prisoner who is in the custody of the state department of corrections ... commits
unlawful sexual conduct by engaging in oral sexual contact, sexual contact or sexual
31.
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inmate sexual abuse as a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum sentence of two years,34 unless force or threat of force is involved, in which
case a maximum penalty of life imprisonment can be imposed. 5
Despite efforts put forth by states and the federal government to
criminalize staff sexual misconduct, the legal system habitually fails to
enforce these statutes.3 6 Along these lines, a report released by the
intercourse with a person who is employed by the state department of corrections
....
); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1259 (2006) ("A person is guilty of sexual relations in a detention facility when, being a person in custody at a detention facility...
the person engages in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse on the premises
of a detention facility. It shall be no defense that such conduct was consensual. Violation of this section shall be a class G felony."); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 212.187(1)
(2003) ("A prisoner who is in lawful custody or confinement.., and who voluntarily
engages in sexual conduct with another person is guilty of a category D felony .. ");
Smith, Rethinking Prison Sex, supra note 17, at 220 (charging that these laws punishing inmates for staff sexual misconduct have had "unsurprising" negative effects on
the rate of prosecution of staff offenders, as well as on inmate reporting of sexual misconduct).
The result, at least in Delaware, has been that staff who violate these laws
are reassigned while inmates receive both disciplinary and criminal penalties .... [T]his has created a situation where inmates are reluctant to
report for fear of not being believed and for fear of receiving additional
criminal and administrative sanctions.
Id.
34. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2243(b), 2244(a)(4) (West Supp. 2006) (limiting the federal
penalties for staff-on-inmate sexual contact).
35. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2241(a)-(b), 2242, 2244(a)(1)-(a)(2), 2244(a)(5) (West 2000 &
Supp. IV 2004) (expanding the federal penalties for staff-on-inmate sexual contact
when force or threat of force is used); DETERRING STAFF SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note
20, at 8 (detailing the federal law and penalties for staff sexual abuse of inmates while
simultaneously emphasizing the importance of "effective prosecution and punishment" in order to deter such misconduct). A huge deficiency remains in the federal
law surrounding staff sexual misconduct due to the fact that it only covers sexual misconduct in Bureau of Prison facilities, not contract facilities. Id. at 1. This legal gap
often allows staff perpetrators in contract facilities to escape prosecution. Id.
36. See Women Prisoners of the D.C. Dep't of Corr. v. District of Columbia, 877 F.
Supp. 634, 642 (D.D.C. 1994) (recognizing that the D.C. Department of Corrections typically transfers suspected staff offenders to new facilities rather than pursuing

prosecution);

STAFF PERSPECTIVES,

supra note 7, at 20 ("The culture in the prose-

cutor's office about prison rape is where corrections was 20 years ago. The
community sees that sexual assault is somehow justified. Who cares about inmates
when they have probably hurt somebody themselves?"); Katherine C. Parker, Female Inmates Living in Fear: Sexual Abuse by CorrectionalOfficers in the District of
Columbia, 10 Am. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 443, 472 (2002) (acknowledging
the "endemic" nature of the lack of prosecution of staff sexual offenders); American
Civil Liberties Union, Words from Prison-Did you know ... ?:The Link Between Incarceration and Violence, http://www.aclu.org/womensrights/violence/
25829res20060612.html#II (emphasizing the lack of prosecution of prison staff accused of staff sexual misconduct, and providing as evidence the fact that, in 1997,
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Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (OIG) in April
2005, entitled Deterring Staff Sexual Abuse of FederalInmates, revealed
that "the majority" of staff sexual abuse cases studied did not end in
prosecution.37 Similarly, a report released by the National Institute of
Corrections in 2000, entitled Sexual Misconduct in Prisons: Law, Remedies, and Incidence, described the outcomes of various sexual misconduct
investigations of Department of Corrections staff in 1998.8 The report
explained that the most common fate for staff involved in substantiated
staff-on-inmate sexual misconduct was to be discharged. The second
most common outcome was resignation,39 while prosecution and discipline were the two least common outcomes. ° Furthermore, of the staff
actually prosecuted by the OIG between 2000 and 2004, the majority,
or 73%, received only a sentence of probation, while 15% were sentenced to less than one year of incarceration, and 2% were only required
to pay a fine.4'

37.

38.

39.
40.

only ten prison employees in the U.S. were disciplined for sexual misconduct); see also
DETERRING STAFF SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 20, at 10 (attempting to explain this
lack of prosecution as the product of insufficiency of evidence, the resignation of the
prison staff member prior to prosecution, or the fact that the cases "lack jury appeal").
DETERRING STAFF SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 20, at 9 (reporting that 45% of the cases
prosecuted, 54% were declined for prosecution, 1% were presented for prosecution
but had not been decided, and only 40% of the cases prosecuted actually resulted in
convictions).
See NAT'L INST. OF CORR., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEXUAL MISCONDUCT IN PRISONS:
LAW, REMEDIES, AND INCIDENCE 10-11 (May 2000), available at http://nicic.org/
Library/016112 [hereinafter SEXUAL MISCONDUCT IN PRISONS] (assessing various
state departments of corrections' systems used to track and respond to staff sexual
misconduct allegations).
Id.
Id. Despite the seemingly lenient treatment of staff offenders, the report concludes,
[T]here has been considerable activity in the past 3 years on the part of
states and DOCs in attempting to prevent or reduce sexual misconduct involving prison staff and inmates. Changes in agency policy, staff training,
and new statutes reflect an increasingly proactive stance toward preventing
and responding to staff sexual misconduct.
Id. at 12.

41. See DETERRING STAFF SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 20, at 10 (using a graph to visually
demonstrate the disparity between the large percentage of staff given probation after
being convicted of sexual abuse of inmates and the small percentage of such staff sentenced to incarceration).
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2. The Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003
In addition to passing the federal criminal statute, Congress put extensive effort into preventing and responding to prison sexual violence
42
through the enactment of the PREA on September 4, 2003. The preenactment congressional record reveals Congress's intentions "to make
prevention and prosecution of sexual assault within correctional facilities
a priority for Federal, State and local institutions and [to] require the
development of national standards for detection, prevention, reduction,
and punishment of these incidents."43
In order to achieve these comprehensive goals, the PREA, inter alia,
calls for the Bureau to gather data regarding the frequency and impact of
prison rape, outlines the methods and sampling techniques that the
42. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 15601-15609 (Supp. IV 2004) (making findings about prison
rape, creating research bodies to further study prison rape, and mandating the development of national standards to respond to and ultimately eliminate prison rape);
Dumond, supra note 19, at 142 (likening prison rape to "a wound that had been festering in American corrections" and, accordingly, likening the PREA to "examination
and treatment" of the wound); Sarah K. Wake, Not Part of the Penalty: The Prison
Rape EliminationAct of 2003, 32 J. LEGIS. 220, 220-21 (2006) (asserting that the issue of prison rape had "too long been quietly swept under the rug") (internal
quotations omitted); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, WOMEN IN CUSTODY 15 (2006),
available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/women/custody/custodyissues.pdf (explaining that the PREA is the first federal law directed at prison rape, and that it applies to
all correctional and detention facilities in the U.S.). The PREA was offered to Congress as a "bipartisan effort to address this problem in a meaningful way and bring
some accountability into America's prisons and jails." 149 CONG. Rac. H7764 (daily
ed. July 25, 2003) (statement of Rep. Scott) [hereinafter 149 CONG. RaC. H7764].
43. 149 CONG. Rac. H7764, supra note 42 (exuding praise for the hard work put into
the creation and passage of the PREA); see 42 U.S.C. § 15602 (enumerating the
PREA's nine essential purposes). These purposes include:
[to] (1) establish a zero-tolerance standard for the incidence of prison rape
in prisons in the United States; (2) make the prevention of prison rape a
top priority in each prison system; (3) develop and implement national
standards for the detection, prevention, reduction, and punishment of
prison rape; (4) increase the available data and information on the incidence of prison rape, consequently improving the management and
administration of correctional facilities; (5) standardize the definitions used
for collecting data on the incidence of prison rape; (6) increase the accountability of prison officials who fail to detect, prevent, reduce, and
punish prison rape; (7) protect the Eighth Amendment rights of Federal,
State, and local prisoners; (8) increase the efficiency and effectiveness of
Federal expenditures through grant programs .. .; and (9) reduce the costs
that prison rape imposes on interstate commerce.
42 U.S.C. § 15602. See also Wake, supra note 42, at 237 (articulating that, above all,
PREA was intended to spread awareness of prison rape and to take the requisite steps
to eradicate it from the American correctional system).
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Bureau must use in its study," and further establishes the National
Prison Rape Elimination Commission, whose mission is to study the
45
effects of prison rape and eventually issue a report on the study.
Through this report, the Commission will assist with the development
of the national standards described above, to be released in late 2007 or
early 2008.46 While these new standards will not create any private right
to sue, a jail or prison's failure to adhere to the standards may result in
decreased federal funding47 and may also be used as evidence in civil
trials to demonstrate that the jail or prison or staff member did not meet
the required standard of care to protect the inmate's safety and wellbeing.

44. See 42 U.S.C. § 15603 (explaining the general objectives, considerations, solicitation
of views, sampling techniques, surveys, and reports that must be involved in the Bureau's "annual comprehensive statistical review").

45. 42 U.S.C. §§ 15606(a)-(d).
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 15606(d)(3) (mandating that the Commission's report be submitted
to the enumerated government officials "no later than 3 years after the date of the initial meeting of the Commission" and that it contain "recommended national
standards for reducing prison rape"). The Attorney General will then publish "a final
rule adopting national standards for the detection, prevention, reduction, and punishment of prison rape" within the year after receiving the Commission's report. 42
U.S.C. § 15607(a)(1). The projected submission year for the Commission's report is
2007. See STOP PRISONER RAPE, PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION ACT UPDATE (Mar.
2007), availableat http://www.spr.org/pdf/SPR PREA_update-3-29.pdf (explaining
the committee process by which the standards will be drafted, as well as the dates on
which the committees are scheduled to meet and complete the standards).

47. See 42 U.S.C. § 15607(c) (listing the requirements for eligibility for federal funds and
thereby creating an incentive for prisons and jails to comply with the standards).

48. See

NAT'L INST. OF CORR., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION ACT

LOCAL JAILS: THE FACTS 4 (2006), available at http://nicic.org/Downloads/
PDF/Library/021455.pdf [hereinafter THE FACTS] (posing and answering frequently
asked questions about PREA by local jails, such as "[aire there currently standards
that we must comply with?," "[c]an I be sued for not complying with PREA?," and
"[wihat are the consequences to my jail for not complying with PREA?"). See gener-

AND

ally David K. Ries, Duty-To-Protect Claims By Inmates After the Prison Rape
Elimination Act, 13 J. L. & POL'Y 915, 971-90 (2005) (analyzing two pending federal
lawsuits in order to demonstrate the potential impact of the PREA on prisoners'
rights litigation). The data generated under the PREA will provide inmate claimants
with "better records" of the incidence and harms of prison sexual violence, as well as
"more effective administrative processes" to report any incidents or threats of harm.
Id. at 972-73. As a result, deliberate indifference will likely be easier for inmate
claimants to prove, and more "meaningful remedies" will be possible under the new
standards generated by the PREA. Id. at 973.
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While the PREA itself applies the traditional definition of rape,' 9 it
grants the Bureau license to redefine rape in its study.5 ° Significantly, the
Bureau has chosen to define rape to include a more extensive range of
sexual misconduct, including "[n]onconsensual sex acts," "[a] busive sexual contact," "[s]taff sexual misconduct," and "staff sexual harassment.""
This broader definition has enabled the Bureau to undertake more
comprehensive studies, resulting in data that more accurately reflects the
multi-faceted nature of prison sexual violence.52
The post-enactment reactions to the PREA have been varied, and it
is still unclear what impact, if any, the PREA will have on the incidence
of prison rape." Nevertheless, without the PREAs mandate to the
Bureau to gather data on prison rape, and the Bureau's ensuing report
on sexual violence in the correctional system, there would be no official
acknowledgement of the high incidence of staff-on-inmate sexual abuse
perpetrated by female staff.

49. See 42 U.S.C.

§

15609(9). The statute defines rape relatively narrowly as:

A) the carnal knowledge, oral sodomy, sexual assault with an object, or
sexual fondling of a person, forcibly or against that person's will; (B) the
carnal knowledge, oral sodomy, sexual assault with an object, or sexual
fondling of a person not forcibly or against the person's will, where the victim is incapable of giving consent because of his or her youth or his or her
temporary or permanent mental or physical incapacity; or (C) the carnal
knowledge, oral sodomy, sexual assault with an object, or sexual fondling
of a person, achieved through the exploitation of the fear or threat of
physical violence or bodily injury.

Id.
50.
51.

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 15603(a)(2)(A)-(D) (giving the Bureau authority to determine how
to define rape, collect information, and adjust the data in its study).
BUREAU SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra note 8, at 3 (including both "consensual" and
"nonconsensual" acts of a sexual nature under its definition of rape, thereby distin-

guishing its definition from the more narrow, traditional one utilized by the PREA).
52. But see id. at 2 (noting that prison rape data is often unreliable due to the psychological pressures in prison and related problems with reporting).
53. For instance, human rights organizations have expressed their concern that the PREA
will influence correctional authorities to "strictly enforc[e] existing prison policies
that prohibit all sex between inmates and in some instances all sexual expression, including masturbation." Smith, Rethinking Prison Sex, supra note 17, at 193-94
(arguing that prisoners have a right to sexual self-expression, and that allowing room
for this sexual expression would serve certain penological interests). Furthermore,
other critics have argued that the PREA is a "superficial gesture of little substance."
Wake, supra note 42, at 223. On the other hand, some scholars have praised the
PREA for finally acknowledging and shedding light on the issue of prison rape. Id. at
237.
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B. The FederalCourts and Case Law
The federal courts provide another arena in which to hold prison
officials liable for sexual harms inflicted on inmates by staff members or
other inmates. Specifically, inmate victims can turn to the federal courts
for vindication of their Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment in the form of rape.54 They can bring Section
1983 actions against prison officials for not protecting their Eighth
Amendment rights in the face of substantial risks of serious harm during
their prison term, including sexual assault." Such failure-to-protect cases
will then be assessed under the "deliberate indifference" standard, which
the Supreme Court articulated in Farmer v. Brennan in 1994.56
Section 1983, also known as the Civil Rights Act of 1871, creates a
direct federal cause of action against those who, "acting under color of"
law, deprive litigants of their constitutional or legal rights.5 7 Prisoners, in
particular, have been able to take advantage of Section 1983 as a means
for obtaining damages for violence inflicted by prison officials or other
inmates. Prison officials can be held personally liable under Section
54.

55.

56.

57.
58.

See Robertson, A Clean Heart,supra note 21, at 34-36, 50 (explaining the willingness
of several federal courts to conclude that inmate fears of prison sexual violence inflict
an Eighth Amendment violation). See, e.g., Martin v. White, 742 F.2d 469, 474 (8th
Cir. 1984) (holding that the plaintiff inmates' Eighth Amendment protections
against cruel and unusual punishment were violated when prison staff acted with deliberate indifference toward the "pervasive risk of harm to the prisoners" generated by
frequent inmate-on-inmate sexual attacks in this particular detention center).
See Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (specifying, in relevant part:
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, or any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States . .. to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law"); Parker, supra note 36, at 453-63 (outlining the possible
routes that prisoners seeking civil redress for violations of their Eighth Amendment
rights can take to obtain federal remedies, and lamenting the detailed and complicated nature of the requirements involved).
See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (weighing the liability of prison officials
for the harm inflicted on a pre-operative transsexual inmate who, upon transfer to a
federal penitentiary, was placed in the general male population and then beaten and
raped by other inmates); Parker, supranote 36, at 454-57 (providing a history of Supreme Court jurisprudence involving the "deliberate indifference" standard, and
pointing out that it is a difficult standard to meet because of its subjective nature).
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
See Bell et al., supra note 26, at 214 n.145 (explaining that under Section 1983, punitive damages may be awarded against prison administrators for any constitutional
violations of male or female inmates' rights while in custody). Cf Robert G. Doumar,
Prisoner Grievances: Prisoner Cases: Feeding the Monster in the Judicial Closet, 14 ST.
Louis U. PUB. L. REV.21, 21, 36 (1994) (arguing that, in the civil context, the large
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1983 for their failure to protect inmates from both official violence
(perpetrated by government actors) 5' and private violence (perpetrated
by other inmates)." Additionally, the "deliberate indifference" standard
applied in these cases has two parts: prison staff are liable for deprivations of prisoners' Eighth Amendment rights when 1) the alleged
deprivation was one that posed "a substantial risk of serious harm," and
2) the prison official 6was
"subjectively aware of the risk," yet deliberately
1
chose to disregard it.
As a result of such failure-to-protect actions, the courts have imposed affirmative duties on prison staff to protect prisoners from both
official and private violence under the Eighth Amendment.62 However,
the federal courts' rulings have been "inconsistent at best" in protecting
inmates from sexual violence in prison. 6' This inconsistency is evidenced, on the one hand, by cases in which the courts actively hold
prison staff liable under both Section 1983 and the deliberate indifference standard, 64 and, on the other hand, by cases in which the courts

59.

60.

61.

62.

63.
64.

number of suits brought under Section 1983 in recent years has placed "an ever increasing burden" on the federal courts, and, as a result, the broader impact of these
claims "has changed from positive to negative").
See, e.g., Riley v. Olk-Long, 282 F.3d 592, 595-97 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding prison
officials liable under Section 1983 for knowing about the risk of harm posed by a
particular correctional officer and failing to protect a female inmate from that risk
and ensuing sexual assault).
See, e.g., Martin v. White, 742 F.2d 469, 475-76 (8th Cit. 1984) (holding prison
officials liable under Section 1983 for "fail[ing] to reasonably respond to the risks of
inmate assaults"). But see Doe v. Bowles, 254 F.3d 617, 622 (6th Cit. 2001) (dismissing the inmate's Section 1983 case against prison officials on the basis that "there are
genuine issues of material fact which preclude review of this claim"); Langston v. Peters, 100 F.3d 1235, 1238-41 (7th Cir. 1996) (determining that prison officials did
not violate the plaintiff inmate's Eighth Amendment rights, and were therefore not
liable under Section 1983, due to their lack of knowledge of the risk of harm posed
by the plaintiffs cellmate and the lack of detrimental effect caused by their delay in
obtaining medical treatment for the plaintiff). The court justified its decision by stating: "[elvery injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another does not
constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition of 'cruel and unusual
punishment."' Langston, 100 F.3d at 1237.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828-29; see Robertson, A Clean Heart, supra note 21, at 25 (labeling the Farmer decision as one that "speak[s] to the duty of prison staff to
safeguard inmates from one another").
See Parker, supra note 36, at 453 (rationalizing that this affirmative duty to protect
prisoners' safety and welfare stems from the fact that the state has elected to take prisoners into custody and holds them there against their will).
Smith, Rethinking Prison Sex, supra note 17, at 221-22.
See, e.g., Ware v. Jackson County, 150 F.3d 873, 875-76, 883-85 (8th Cir. 1998)
(awarding damages to plaintiff inmate under Section 1983 for prison employees' deliberate indifference to the substantial risk of harm posed to female inmates by male
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display a high level of deference to prison6 5staff and accordingly grant
them immunity or absolve them of liability.
II.

THE GENDER STEREOTYPE REGARDING MEN, WOMEN, AND
SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE PRISON SYSTEM

A gender stereotype regarding men and women in the prison system pervades the legal response to prison rape: in cross-gender
interactions between prison staff and inmates, men areS.the66 sexual predators and women are the vulnerable or passive victims.

This gender

stereotype prevents the legal system from acknowledging the problem of
staff-on-inmate sexual violence perpetrated by female staff against male
inmates, as revealed by the Bureau's report. Lawmakers must explore and
understand the underlying gender stereotype, including its historical
prison staff in this particular correctional facility, and their resulting failure to protect
plaintiff from staff-on-inmate sexual misconduct).
65. See, e.g., Ice v. Dixon, No. 4:03CV2281, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13429, at *15
(N.D. Ohio July 6, 2005) (granting prison officials' motions for summary judgment
because plaintiff failed to show "that the municipal entity formally adopted or promulgated a policy allowing deputy sheriffs to engage in sexual assault or contact with
female inmates"). See Giller, supra note 22, at 687 (asserting that the deliberate indifference standard is a legal fiction that operates to "keep prison officials free from
liability"); Smith, Rethinking Prison Sex, supra note 17, at 221-22 (alleging that this
inconsistency is due in large part to the immunity granted to states, municipalities,
and public officials who have taken even the smallest steps in "enact[ing] policies and
procedures, conduct[ing] staff training, and [taking] disciplinary action after the fact
against staff or inmate perpetrators"). Even the Farmer decision itself demonstrated
extreme deference toward prison staff, stating, "prison officials who actually knew of
a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm was not ultimately averted." Farmer,
511 U.S. at 844.
66. See Fuchs, supra note 25, at 94 (describing society's perception of sexual victimization
that "only women are sexually assaulted," and claiming that "society is reluctant to
accept the idea that a 'real man' could be reduced to such a sexually passive role");
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J.
1281, 1302 (1991) (considering society's normalization of male-on-female sexual aggression, and explaining that "[i]n traditional gender roles, male sexuality embodies
the role of aggressor, female sexuality the role of victim, and some degree of force is
romanticized as acceptable."). See also Levit, supra note 24, at 94 (assessing how the
law can "reinscribe stereotypes of male aggression" and female passivity). One example of this can be found in rape laws: "social acceptance of male aggression may be
reinforced by rape laws that presume a woman's consent to intercourse in the absence
of her resistance." Id. Cf Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights
Analysis, 63 TEx. L. REV. 387, 405 (1984) (emphasizing the "sexual stereotype of
men as aggressors and women as passive victims" that lies at the root of some statutory rape laws).
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development, in order to overcome it and replace it with a more accurate conception of men and women's roles in prison as reflected in the
drafting of future legislation.
A. HistoricalShifts in Thinking Giving Rise
to the Gender Stereotype
Prison sexual violence has historically been considered a male inmate-on-inmate issue. This viewpoint is commonly reflected in jokes,
popular media portrayals of the prison setting,67 and scholarly writing
on the subject from the 1980s and 1990s.6 ' The male inmate-on-inmate
focus stems from the traditional perception of prison as an environment
dominated by patriarchy and hierarchy, in which an "inter-male dominance ... system" allows some men to take control while others submit
both socially and sexually. 69 Within this perceived system, the dominant

67. See Mary Sigler, By the Light of Virtue: Prison Rape and the Corruptionof Character,91
IOWA L. REv. 561, 563 (2006). Sigler relates two socially acceptable prison rape
jokes, one told by California Attorney General Bill Lockyer at a press conference regarding former Enron Chairman Kenneth Lay, and one depicted in a soft drink
television commercial:
Bill Lockyer joked that he would 'love to personally escort Lay to an eightby-ten cell that he could share with a tattooed dude who says, "Hi, my name
is Spike, honey."' ... Meanwhile, a recent advertising campaign for a popular soft drink features the company's pitch man, the comedian Godfrey,
distributing cans of soda in prison. When he drops a can, he starts to bend
over to pick it up, but quickly stops himself, saying, 'I'm not picking that
up.' The commercial ends with Godfrey seated in a cell next to a large, tattooed inmate whose arm is draped around him. When Godfrey delivers the
company's tag line-'When you drink 7UP, everyone is your friend'-the
inmate tightens his hold, to Godfrey's obvious discomfort.
Id. See generally Helen Eigenberg & Agnes Baro, If You Drop the Soap in the Shower
You Are On Your Own: Images of Male Rape in Selected Prison Movies, 7 SEXuALITY &
CULTURE 56 (2003) (considering the accuracy of portrayals of male rape in fifteen
drama and action films about male prisons).
68. See DANIEL LOCKWOOD, PRISON SEXUAL VIOLENCE 1 (1980) (treating the study of
prison sexual aggression as a study of male, homosexual behavior); MICHAEL SCARCE,
MALE ON MALE RAPE: THE HIDDEN TOLL OF STIGMA AND SHAME 37 (1997) (analyzing prison rape simply as a product of the power struggle between male inmates).
69. See Giller, supra note 22, at 660-62 (contending that the hierarchy and patriarchy at
work in the prison system act as "tool[s] of social control and punishment"); Sabo,
supra note 23, at 6, 11 (arguing that hegemonic masculinity is perpetuated in prisons
through expressions of sexuality involving domination and subordination). "The act
of prison rape is clearly tied to the constitution of intermale dominance hierarchies.
Rapes between male prisoners are often described as if they occurred between men
and women in terms of master and slave." Id. at 11.
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men are thought to play a masculine role while the submissive men play
a more feminine role.70
While prison sexual violence continues to be a problem among
male inmates, an explosion in the number of female inmates in U.S.
prisons in the early 1990s7' brought a shift in both popular and scholarly thinking about the extent of prison sexual violence and the identity
of its victims. A series of cases decided in the 1990s was essential in exposing the72full extent of sexual abuse of female inmates at the hands of
male staff.
In particular, Women Prisonersof Districtof Columbia Departmentof
Corrections v. District of Columbia73 played a key role in spreading such
awareness. This case, brought in 1993 in the United States District
Court for the District of the Columbia, determined that the extensive
sexual assaults perpetrated by male prison staff against female inmates in
the D.C. correctional system violated their Eighth Amendment rights.74
75 initially
In addition, Nunn v. Michigan Department of Corrections,
brought in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan in 1996 and ultimately settled in 1999, was also significant
because it uncovered rampant sexual violence, threats, and privacy viola70. See LOCKWOOD, supra note 68, at 124-25 (explaining that male aggressors, who typically come from heterosexual backgrounds, view themselves as ultra-masculine and
their male victims as "desirable females"). "By any definition relative to self-concept,
the prison sexual aggressor is heterosexual. He prefers women, placing men in female
roles." Id. at 125.
71. See TRACY L. SNELL & DANIELLE C. MORTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: WOMEN IN PRISON, SURVEY OF STATE PRISON

72.

73.
74.

75.

INMATES, 1991 (1991) (calculating that while the general State prison population
grew 58% between 1986 and 1991, the number of women in State prisons grew 75%
from yearend 1986 to yearend 1992, and reporting that at that time, women were
5.2% of all prisoners, up from 4.7% in 1986).
See Chapter 13: SexualAbuse of Women in Prison,A Thematic Case Study, in THE FORD
FOUNDATION, CLOSE TO HOME: CASE STUDIES OF HUMAN RIGHTS WORK IN THE
UNITED STATES 98 (2004), availableat http://www.fordfound.org/publications/recentarticles/docs/dose to home/toc-intro.pdf [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WORK] (noting
that these ultimately formative cases were originally brought with much more smallscale, immediate goals in mind).
877 F. Supp. 634, 666 (D.D.C. 1994) (holding the defendants liable for their deliberate indifference to the sexual harm perpetrated against the female inmate plaintiffs).
Women Prisonersof D.C, 877 F. Supp. at 665 ("The evidence revealed a level of sexual harassment which is so malicious that it violates contemporary standards of
decency .... Rape, coerced sodomy, unsolicited touching of women prisoners' vaginas, breasts and buttocks by prison employees are 'simply not part of the penalty that
criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.' ").
No. 96-CV-71416, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22970, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 4, 1997)
(granting in part and denying in part defendants' motion to dismiss, thereby allowing
plaintiffs to proceed with discovery and pursuit of administrative remedies).
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tions being perpetrated by male staff against female inmates in the
Michigan Department of Corrections.7 6 Not only did these cases draw
attention to the problems specifically facing female inmates, but they
also played a role in establishing recognition of the widespread occurrence of staff sexual misconduct in the correctional system. 77
In 1996, Human Rights Watch issued a report, All Too Familiar:
The Sexual Abuse of Women in U.S. State Prisons, based on the findings
of an investigation into the staff-on-inmate sexual abuse of women in
prison. 7' The report received extensive press coverage and produced
much-needed visibility for the issue.79 Over the next few years, Amnesty
International issued three additional reports: Rights ForAll in 1998, Not
PartofMy Sentence in 1999, and Abuse of Women in Custody: Sexual Misconduct and Shackling of Pregnant Women in 2001." The attention
generated by these reports brought about a "women-in-prison movement" that could be felt across the country and abroad."' While this new

76. Nunn, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22970 at *3. See

77.

78.

79.

80.

HUMAN RIGHTS WORK, supra note
72, at 98 (describing case law as one target for human rights activists concerned with
the treatment of women in prison to direct their efforts toward, and further describing the outcomes of some such strategically brought cases).
See Brenda V. Smith, Watching You, Watching Me, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 225,
236 (2003) [hereinafter Smith, Watching You] (arguing that as a result of such cases,
the public became more willing to accept that staff-on-inmate sexual abuses actually
occur).
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ALL Too FAMILIAR: THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF WOMEN IN
U.S. PRISONS (1996), available at http://hrw.org/reports/1996/Us1.htm [hereinafter
ALL Too FAMILIAR] (reflecting on data collected from March 1994 to November
1996 regarding the sexual abuse of female inmates by male prison staff in eleven state
prisons in the United States).
See HUMAN RIGHTS WORK, supra note 72, at 100 (examining the historical development of awareness about the plight of women in prison, as driven by the reports
published by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International).
AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL,
RIGHTS
FOR ALL (1998), available at http://
www.rightsforall.amnesty.org/info/report/index.htm (exposing the human rights violations that occur in the United States, particularly those abuses that transpire within the
correctional system); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, "NOT PART OF MY SENTENCE": VIOLATIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY (1999), available at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/us/document.do?id=D1F037D8618F4F6D802569000069
2F87 (providing profiles of women in prison in the United States and the human rights
abuses they experience, as well as recommendations for how to incorporate international
standards into the correctional system to eliminate these abuses); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY: SEXUAL MISCONDUCT AND SHACKLING OF

(2001), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/women/custody/
(delineating the scope of abuse of women in U.S. prisons and the legal framework
surrounding custodial sexual misconduct).
See HUMAN RIGHTS WORK, supra note 72, at 102 (referencing the headlines of some
newspaper articles published at the height of this movement to demonstrate the
PREGNANT WOMEN

81.
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emphasis on the plight of women in prison helped to increase awareness
of the issue and make more extensive remedies available,82 it also fostered
the gender stereotype that women in prisons are typically victims to
male aggression.
Today, the growing presence of female correctional staff in men's
prisons,83 and the surfacing threat they pose,84 necessitates another shift

popular sentiment around this issue). See, e.g., Elizabeth Olson, UN.
PanelIs Told of
Rights Violations in US. WomenscPrisons,N.Y. TIMES, March 31, 1999, at A16.
82. See HuMAN RIGHTS WORK,supra note 72, at 102 (referencing the positive outcomes
of the women-in-prison movement, and explaining that, above all, the most important outcome was the shared human rights vision and connection that activists were
able to generate internationally: "This more expansive intellectual framework allowed
activists to come together in a steady, if not always easy, collaboration that they maintain to this day.").
83. See Mary Ann Farkas & Kathryn R.L. Rand, Female CorrectionalOfficers and Prisoner
Privacy, 80 MARQ. L. REv. 995, 1027 (1997) ("Women clearly have obtained the
right to work in men's prison. Prior to 1972, virtually no women worked as correctional officers in male prisons; today women supervise male inmates in every state
and federal prison, as well as in most county institutions."); Richard Tewksbury &
Sue Carter Collins, Aggression Levels Among CorrectionalOfficers: Reassessing Sex Differences, 86 PRISON J. 327, 328 (2006) (addressing the trend since 1992 of allowing
women to work in high-security-level institutions). Today, women constitute onethird of the correctional staff in the U.S. Id. See also Kerle, supra note 8, at 55-56
(contending that the number of women working in U.S. jails is on the rise: "In 1998,
females working as correctional officers in local jails stood at 22.6 percent. By 1993,
the figure increased to 24.2 percent. By 1999, the percentage of female jail officers
reached 28 percent. The slow, incremental growth continues.").
84. See BUREAU SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra note 8 (presenting the Bureau's recently released data regarding the high percentage of female staff perpetrators of sexual
misconduct in prisons). In addition to the data released in the Bureau's report, newspapers are also beginning to acknowledge the threat that female prison staff pose to
male inmates. See, e.g., Green, supra note 17 (referencing the Bureau's recently released data and declaring that those statistics indeed apply to Virginia, where three
out of four substantiated incidents of staff sexual misconduct involved a female staff
perpetrator); Jerry Seper, Sex Abuse: 'A SignificantProblem'in Prisons,WASH. TIMES,
May 4, 2005, at A06 (acknowledging that "one misconception about the sexual abuse
of inmates is that it only involves male staff and female inmates" and recognizing that
"the scope of the problem includes female staff with male inmates"). Furthermore,
the abuse of prisoners by female staff members was recognized on an international
level with the publication of photographs of Private First Class Lynndie England
abusing male prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison in 2003. See IN THE SHADOWS, supra
note 22, at 3 (pointing out sarcastically that the sexual abuse and humiliation of Iraqi
prisoners at Abu Ghraib was not, as then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld put
it, "fundamentally un-American," in light of the extensive sexual abuse perpetrated
on a daily basis in detention facilities on U.S. soil); Ellen Goodman, Op-Ed, The
Downside of Equality, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 30, 2005, at A21 ("These photos [of
Lynndie England] not only shattered the image of Americans in Iraq. They were gender-bending to the breaking point. A country barely used to the idea of women in
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in thinking. This shift must acknowledge the existence of female staff
perpetrators and male inmate victims so that a more sensitive response
to prison sexual violence can be developed. If male victimization is not
acknowledged, the prison code of silence described earlier 5 may be inadvertently perpetuated. Consequently, these male victims may be
86
abandoned by the legal system.
B. Manifestations of the Gender Stereotype in the CourtSystem
The popularized focus on sexual misconduct between male staff
and female inmates in the 1990s, as described above, inspired debates
about the advantages and disadvantages of same- and cross-gender supervision in corrections.87 Since that time, inmates and staff alike have
brought many challenges to prisons' cross-gender supervision policies.88
The courts' responses to these challenges indicate a clear manifestation
of the gender stereotype in the legal system.89 On the one hand, the
courts often take a protectionist approach to women's claims, regardless
of the claimant's inmate or staff status, whereas, on the other hand, the
courts are not usually as sympathetic to men's claims.9 ° Thus, at the

85.

86.

87.
88.

89.

90.

war was suddenly confronted with the portrait of a woman as an equal-opportunity
abuser.").
See supra Introduction (describing the causes and effects of the prison code of silence
on the general inmate population and more specifically on male inmates who have
been victimized by female staff).
See Levit, supra note 24, at 93 (explaining a dilemma that arises from studying the
victimization of men-on the one hand, such a study acknowledges male victimization so that "forms of oppression [do not] go unchecked," but, on the other hand,
such a study "may [also] promote passivity, helplessness, and blaming behavior on the
part of victims"). The only way to avoid this dilemma is to "learn to examine gender
role stereotypes as evidential facts rather than mere opportunities for blame." Id. at
93. Above all, one must avoid perpetuating denial of the issue: "Treating a problem
as nonexistent helps keep it that way." Id. at 98. Cf Levine, supra note 25, at 359
(recognizing that scholars of statutory rape must "notice female sexual exploitation of
male minors" or risk "abandon [ing] an entire class of victims who deserve better").
See Smith, Watching You, supra note 77, at 246 (labeling the issue of same-sex supervision as a true "corrections policy" concern at the end of the 20th century).
See, e.g., Grummett v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491, 492-93, 496 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding the practice of allowing cross-gender prison officials to view male inmates while
they are nude because the prison's interest in maintaining security outweighs the inmates' interest in privacy).
See Smith, Watching You, supra note 77, at 247-48 ("The outcome of these challenges has depended in large part on three factors: (1) the gender of the inmate;
(2) the gender of the staff person; and (3) the nature of the intrusion involved.").
See Levit, supra note 24, at 97 (highlighting the greater privacy rights granted to
women in custody than men in custody due to the courts' assumptions that "[m]ale
prisoners have diminished expectations of privacy relative to similarly situated women
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heart of the courts' responses in cross-gender supervision cases is the
belief that typically women in prison are either victims or innocuous
members of the prison community and men are aggressors.9'
These challenges are raised in one of four ways. On the inmate
level, male prisoners challenge their supervision by female stafr 2 and
female prisoners challenge their supervision by male staff.93 On the staff
level, male staff challenge their exclusion from positions in women's correctional institutions 4 and female staff challenge policies that limit their
placement in men's correctional institutions. 9

91.

92.

93.

94.

95.

prisoners" and that "men are invulnerable, autonomous, and they can build their
own walls," unlike women); Bell et al., supra note 26, at 222 (raising concerns about
the "gender stratification of current judicial rulings on this issue," in which courts are
more willing to recognize the privacy rights of female inmates than male inmates);
Farkas & Rand, supra note 83, at 1024 (drawing attention to the courts' application
of "gender specific" standards in evaluating sexuality and abuse in prisons); Karoline
E. Jackson, The Legitimacy of Cross-GenderSearches and Surveillance in Prisons: Defining an Appropriateand Uniform Review, 73 IND. L.J. 959, 961 (1998) (alluding to the
greater difficulties male inmates have in establishing privacy claims than female inmates).
See Smith, Watching You, supra note 77, at 276-78 (acknowledging that even female
prison officials, who have a position of authority over male inmates, are seen by the
courts as vulnerable to men in custody). "It may be that courts believe that even in
the prison context, where female staff wear the superficial vestiges of power and control, they are still less powerful than men, even imprisoned men." Id. at 277.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 145, 147, 150-51 (7th Cit. 1995) (rejecting plaintiff inmate's argument that cross-gender supervision over naked inmates in
the cells, showers, and toilet areas violated his Fourth and Eighth Amendment rights
on the basis that such surveillance is not unreasonable nor does it inflict unnecessary
injury); Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093, 1097, 1103 (8th Cir. 1990) (denying relief
to male inmates under Section 1983 for alleged right to privacy and equal protection
violations during routine cross-gender pat down searches and surveillance).
See, e.g., Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1522, 1531 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding in
favor of a class of female inmates for a policy requiring "male guards to conduct random, non-emergency, suspicionless clothed body searches on female prisoners" in
violation of the inmates' Eighth Amendment rights); Lee v. Downs, 641 F.2d 1117,
1119 (4th Cir. 1981) (affirming the lower court's verdict in favor of plaintiff on her
privacy violation claim regarding male staff who assisted in forcefully removing her
underclothes).
See, e.g., Tharp v. Iowa Dep't of Corr., 68 F.3d 223, 224 (8th Cit. 1995) (rejecting
plaintiff male staff members' arguments that the prison's gender-based shift assignment policy discriminated against them on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Torres v. Wis. Dep't of Health & Soc. Serv., 859 F.2d
1523, 1524 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding in favor of plaintiff male staff because defendants failed to articulate a valid bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense
for their discriminatory policy of employing only female staff in certain units).
See, e.g., Reidt v. County of Trempealeau, 975 F.2d 1336, 1337, 1341 (7th Cit.
1992) (dismissing plaintiff staff member's claim that she was denied promotion to a
traditionally male-only jailer position because of her sex); Hardin v. Stynchcomb,
691 F.2d 1364, 1369-70, 1374 (11 th Cit. 1982) (striking down a jail's policy of dis-
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1. Inmates' Challenges to Cross-Gender Supervision
Inmates can raise challenges to cross-gender supervision policies
pursuant to Section 1983, as described earlier.96 Under this rubric, they
often argue that cross-gender supervision violates their privacy rights
under the Fourth Amendment and their right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 7 The courts have
shown repeatedly that they are more willing to entertain the Eighth
Amendment claims of female claimants than male claimants. 8 When
and if courts do grant relief to men in this context, which is a rare event,
the courts typically only do so under the Fourth Amendment." These
divergent outcomes stem from the courts' perception that cross-gender
supervision affects men and women differently, and consequently "[a]cts
permitted when female staff supervise male inmates are not permitted
when male staff supervise female inmates."' 00 Therefore, at the crux of

96.
97.

98.

99.

100.

criminating against female jailers by barring them from working with male inmates
on the basis of the jail's failure to articulate a valid BFOQ defense).
See supra Part I.B. (clarifying the uses for Section 1983 in prisoners' rights litigation).
See generally Teresa A. Miller, Sex & Surveillance: Gender, Privacy & the Sexualization
of Power in Prison, 10 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTs. L.J. 291 (1999-2000) (analyzing a
variety of cross-gender supervision claims in light of the "sexualization of power"
through sexual violence inherent in cross-gender searches).
See, e.g.,Jordan,986 F.2d at 1531 (deciding the case on Eighth Amendment grounds
and intentionally excluding consideration of any other constitutional claims);
Coleman v. Vasquez, 142 F. Supp. 2d 226, 234 (D. Conn. 2001) (expressing a willingness to consider plaintiffs Eighth Amendment claims "to the extent the searches
are alleged to have caused extreme emotional distress due to her circumstances as a
sexually traumatized woman").
See, e.g., Haynes v. Marriott, 70 F.3d 1144, 1147-48 (10th Cit. 1996) (finding that
a body cavity search performed on a male inmate in front of many female staff members could constitute a Fourth Amendment violation); Fortner v. Thomas, 983 F.2d
1024, 1030 (11th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that a male prisoner retains a constitutional right to bodily privacy that may be violated by female staff supervision while
the inmate is in the shower or using the toilet); see Farkas & Rand, supra note 83, at
1014 (describing the Eighth Amendment burden as much more "onerous" for male
claimants to carry in cross-gender supervision cases than the Fourth Amendment
burden). But see Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 744 (5th Cir. 2002) ("Prisoners retain, at best, a very minimal Fourth Amendment interest in privacy after
incarceration").
Smith, Watching You, supra note 77, at 278. One scholar has argued that the courts'
reliance on such stereotypes can often become a self-fulfilling prophesy:
In accepting this duality of aggression and vulnerability, judges are not just
rationalizing outcomes they can feel comfortable with on the basis of presumed traits. They are actually constructing a reality within prisons. They
are ultimately writing rules around the fact that 'boys will be boys' rather
than facilitating a culture of change within prisons that requires male
guards to conduct themselves professionally.
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the courts' disparate responses to men and women's claims is the gender
stereotype described earlier.
Generally speaking, in order to grant an Eighth Amendment claim,
the court must believe that the claimant is particularly vulnerable to
pain.'O' Women have most likely had more success with such claims because the legal system continues to perceive women as the only potential
victims. 102 Furthermore, "[c]ourts obviously do not credit the view that
men can experience trauma, threat, or embarrassment from the routine
viewing and touching of their bodies by female staff in the same way
that women inmates would experience that same conduct by male
staff."' 3 On the other hand, in order to grant a Fourth Amendment
claim, the court must believe that a claimant's privacy and dignity has
been violated. °4 Men have most likely had more success with such
claims because, by taking such a route, the courts can affirm male inmates' dignity and invulnerability, in line with the gender stereotype of
men in prison.0 5 The courts' vulnerability/dignity dualism encourages
male and female claimants to shape their claims along these more gendered lines in order to be successful. 10 6 As a result, the courts "deny

101.

102.

103.
104.

105.

106.

Teresa A. Miller, Keeping the Government's Hands Off Our Bodies: MappingA Feminist Legal Theory Approach to Privacy in Cross-GenderPrison Searches, 4 BUFF. CRIM.
L. REV. 861, 871 (2001).
See Jackson, supra note 90, at 983 (pointing out that in order to establish that an
Eighth Amendment violation has occurred, prisoners must demonstrate "(1) that
pain was inflicted and (2) that the infliction was unnecessary and wanton") (internal
quotations omitted).
See Bell et al., supra note 26, at 216 ("[T1he notion that only women can be victims
... continues to pervade the legal culture."); Smith, Watching You, supra note 77, at
279 (arguing that "[m]en have been socialized to detach from vulnerability," whereas
women have been socialized to embrace and identify with it"); see also Jackson, supra
note 90, at 983 ("[I]t has been easier for female inmates to establish 'infliction of
pain' based on expert testimony concerning the debilitating and dehumanizing effect
that cross-gender search policies have on female inmates .... ").
Smith, Watching You, supra note 77, at 277; see Miller, supra note 100, at 864
("[T]he sexual vulnerability of male inmates is rarely acknowledged .... ").
See Jackson, supra note 90, at 981 (describing the Fourth Amendment as a protection
of one's "self-respect and personal dignity"); see also Smith, Watching You, supra note
77, at 278 (explaining that in Fourth Amendment challenges to cross-gender supervision, "[men] have spoken of supervision by women as humiliating and embarrassing,
apparently finding it less acceptable to be under the control of a woman than a
man").
See Smith, Watching You, supra note 77, at 277 (questioning the motivation behind
the courts' typical "dignity" response to male claimants in cross-gender supervision
cases). Smith ponders whether the courts' underlying perception that inmates do not
experience vulnerability when they are naked is "solely because they are men" or because of their powerful and dangerous criminal identities. Id.
See id. at 278 (explaining that the reality of the litigation process is that "advocates
frame their appeals and tell their clients' stories in ways that courts can recognize and
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agency" to male and female claimants to frame their grievances in individualized ways,' °7 and thereby reinforce the gender stereotype.
2. Staff Members' Challenges to Same-Sex Supervision
Male and female prison staff can bring claims pursuant to Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 alleging sex-based employment discrimination against institutions that only hire staff of the same sex as the
inmates.' s Incorporated into Title VII is the "bona fide occupational
qualification" (BFOQ) defense found in Section 2000e-2(e)(1), which
allows employers to discriminate in hiring if doing so is "reasonably necessary" to normal functioning of their business.'0 9 Two employment
discrimination cases in particular provide clear examples of the ways that
courts' rationales and uses of language foster the gender stereotype in
this context.
Dothard v. Rawlinson is the only case to have reached the Supreme
Court challenging sex discrimination in the hiring of female prison
hear," namely an approach that reinforces traditional constructions of femininity and
masculinity). As a result, male and female inmates tend to shape their cross-gender
supervision challenges differently:
There is a qualitative difference in the kinds of claims men and women
have made challenging cross-gender supervision. Men have raised claims
challenging cross-gender supervision as a violation of their privacy and dignity .... On the other hand, women challenge cross-gender supervision as
a practice that is damaging and destructive, exacerbating existing and past
trauma experienced as children and adults.
Id.
107. Id.at 279.
108. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000) (specifying in relevant
part: "It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin"); see also Farkas & Rand, supra note 83, at 995-96 (providing a history of the
passage of Title VII in 1964 and its amendments in 1972, as well as the elements required to win a sex discrimination claim pursuant to Title VII); Iman R. Soliman,
Male Officers in Women's Prisons: The Needfor Segregation of Officers in Certain Posi-

tions, 10 Tx. J.

WOMEN

& L. 45, 46-48 (2000) (describing the historical

development of sex discrimination case law under Title VII, and throughout the article providing a detailed analysis of various usages of the BFOQ defense).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2000). See also Soliman, supra note 108, at 50, 52-53
(presenting examples of cases in which the BFOQ defense has been successfully argued). Such cases include those in which third-party safety concerns have a direct
impact on an employee's job performance and those in which the privacy rights of
individuals are implicated. Id.
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staff.1 ° Dianne Rawlinson claimed that she was unlawfully discriminated against on the basis of sex when she was denied employment as a
staff member in an Alabama prison."' Using Title VII, she challenged an
Alabama statute mandating specific minimum height and weight requirements for employment as a prison official, as well as an Alabama
regulation prohibiting the hiring of female staff for positions requiring
close contact with inmates. ' 2 Although the Court struck down the statute containing height and weight requirements,' 13 it upheld the
regulation barring the hiring of female staff for close contact positions as
lawful under the BFOQ defense.'
In Dothard, the Court reasoned that this particular Alabama prison
environment demonstrated "rampant violence and a jungle atmosphere," in which there was a great "likelihood that inmates would
assault a woman because she was a woman." . 5 Moreover, the Court reasoned that the staff member's "very womanhood" would hinder her
ability to maintain security in the correctional facility." 6 Although the
Court acknowledged that Congress's original purpose in enacting Tide
VII was to allow women to make their own choices about whether they
would be comfortable working in a certain setting or position," 7 the
Court went on to assert that women's choices were irrelevant to this
case.

110. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). See also Farkas & Rand, supra note 83,
at 997 (considering the fact that the ruling of the Dothard case "threatened to subvert
the progress [that had been] made by women" in past Title VII prison employment
cases).
111. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 323.
112. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 322-26.

113. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 332.
114. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 336-37.
115. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 334, 336 (internal quotations omitted). But see Griffin v. Mich.
Dep't of Corrs., 654 F. Supp. 690, 700-01 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (distinguishing itself
from Dothard on the basis that Dothard was limited to the extremely "inhospitable"
conditions of one particular Alabama prison, and the Michigan prison at issue here is
not characterized by the same type of horrible environment) (internal quotations
omitted).
116. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 336.
117. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 335. See aso Farkas & Rand, supra note 83, at 995 (explaining
that the passage of Tide VII acted as the "major impetus" that led to the integration
of staff in prisons). Historically, women were not hired in male prisons because of paternalism and safety concerns. Id. The enactment of Tide VII was intended to
remove "artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible
classification." Griffin, 654 F. Supp. at 700 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401

U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
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More is at stake . . . [here], however, than an individual
woman's decision to weigh and accept the risks of employment
in a 'contact' position in a maximum-security male prison.
The essence of a correctional counselor's job is to maintain
prison security. A woman's relative ability to maintain order in
a male, maximum-security, unclassified penitentiary of the
type Alabama now runs could be directly reduced by her
womanhood.'18
This language directly equates victim status with womanhood, and
thereby exemplifies the ingrained nature of the gender stereotype in the
Court's perception of female staff."9 The corollary to the Court's rationale is that men in prison have uncontrollable sexual appetites. Thus, the
majority's language also indirectly equates aggressor status with manhood.
Another case presented the reverse scenario. In Everson v. Michigan
Department of Corrections, a group of male and female prison staff sued
the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) under Title VII,
alleging that the MDOC's policy barring males from employment in
certain positions in its female prisons unlawfully discriminated on the
basis of sex. 120 Similar to the Dothard decision, the Sixth Circuit
held
2
that the MDOC's policy was lawful under the BFOQ defense.1 1
Applying the same rationale as in Dothard, the Everson court directly equated aggressor status with manhood and indirectly equated
victim status with womanhood. 2 2 This holding further illustrates the
pervasiveness of the gender stereotype in the legal culture. Drawing specifically on the rationale and language in Dothard, and modifying it to
apply to reversed facts, the court reasoned that "allegations of sexual
abuse engender hesitancy in male officers and mistrust between inmates
118. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 335.
119. The Dotharddissent acknowledged the victimizing impact of the majority's rationale:
In short, the fundamental justification for the decision is that women as
guards will generate sexual assaults. With all respect, this rationale regrettably perpetuates one of the most insidious of the old myths about womenthat women, wittingly or not, are seductive sexual objects. The effect of the
decision ... is to punish women because their very presence might provoke
sexual assaults ....Once again, "[t]he pedestal upon which women have
been placed has ....upon closer inspection, been revealed as a cage."
Dothard, 433 U.S. at 345 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby,

485 P.2d 529, 541 (Cal. 1971)).
120. Everson v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 391 F.3d 737, 740 (6th Cit. 2004).
121. Everson, 391 F.3d at 747.
122. Everson, 391 F.3d at 755.
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and guards, and thus the 'very manhood' of male [correctional officers]
...undermines their capacity to provide security., 123 The court's holding
stemmed from its sense that the history of male sexual aggression in
MDOC prisons would create fear in the minds of vulnerable female inmates24and thus diminish male staff members' ability to perform their
1
jobs.
C. The Failureto ProsecuteFemale StaffPerpetrators
The gender stereotype described earlier also influences the disciplinary actions taken against male and female staff perpetrators. Female
staff face less prosecution than their male counterparts, and, if convicted, often receive lighter sentences. 125 Determining the exact types
and percentages of punitive measures taken against female staff perpetrators (including arrest, referral for prosecution, transfer, and discharge) is
are intertwined with
a problematic task because the related statistics
26
perpetrators.1
staff
male
for
available
those
However, this trend is easy to identify in anecdotal evidence, as reported by newspapers across the country in the past few years. In
Washington, a female staff member found guilty of having had sex with
three male inmates received four years probation and a mere "scolding"
from the judge. 27 Similarly, in Pennsylvania, a female corrections worker
was simply sentenced to ten days in prison and probation after being

123. Everson, 391 F.3d at 755.
124. Everson, 391 F.3d at 741 (attributing its decision to "the problem of sexual abuse and
other mistreatment of female inmates [that] has long plagued the MDOC").
125. See Female Sex Offenders: Double Standard?Many Say They Don't Get TreatedAs Harshly
As Men, CBS NEws, June 15, 2006, available at http://www.canadiancrc.com/articles/
CBSFemaleSexOffenders_DoubleStandard_15JUN06.htm (asking the question
"are all sex offenders treated the same?" and considering whether female sex offenders
are penalized as harshly as male sex offenders). Tony Rackauckas, the District Attorney of Orange County, California at the time this article was published, was quoted
as saying, "[t]he reality is that they're just not going to be sentenced to the same kind
of lengthy prison sentences that the men get." Id.
126. See, e.g., BUF.Au SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra note 8, at 11 (providing data on the disciplinary measures taken against all staff perpetrators of sexual misconduct, without
separating the data on the basis of gender).
127. Carrie Johnson, Fired GuardAccepts Plea Deal in Sex Case, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES
(Fla.), July 18, 2002, at 1 (reporting that the judge added a scolding to the defendant's sentence). The judge reprimanded the defendant, saying: "Let me ask you a
question, Ms. Barth, and you don't have to answer this .... What were you thinking? Were you thinking (the inmates] weren't going to run their mouths about their
sexual goings-on with you?" Id.
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convicted of sexually abusing a male inmate. 2 ' The judge in that case
reported that "[i]f the incident had involved a male guard and a female
inmate, . . . the sentence would have included months in jail.""129 In one
Wisconsin case involving a female staff member engaging in sexual misconduct with a male inmate, the staff member received only two years
probation and $1000 fine for two misdemeanor charges-violating
prison rules and obstructing police. The court then withheld conviction
on the second-degree criminal sexual assault charge, which will be dismissed altogether if the female staff member "complete[s] her probation
without any significant rules violations or new crimes."13 And in another Wisconsin case, a prison warden waited four months before
reporting male inmates'
allegations of sexual misconduct by two female
13
'
corrections officers.

Conversely, in New York, a male staff member convicted of raping
two female inmates received eight years in prison and is awaiting further
sentencing for other related counts." 2 Upon release, he is required to
serve an additional three years of probation and must register on the
New York Sex Offender Registry. 3' In Tennessee, a male corrections
worker charged with rape and official misconduct faces "up to 30 years
for the rape charge and up to six years for misconduct" if convicted. 4
And in New Hampshire, a male staff member is currently serving a tento twenty- year prison sentence for his convictions of rape, sexual assault, and simple assault against a female inmate." 5 Although anecdotal,
these news stories paint an accurate picture of the fervent prosecution of
male staff perpetrators and relatively half-hearted prosecution of female
staff perpetrators.
The gender stereotype is a central contributing factor to this discrepancy in the correctional response to staff-on-inmate sexual misconduct. As
described earlier, male inmates are less likely than female inmates to
128. J.C. North, Prison Guard Gets 10 Days for Sex Charge, PUB. OPINION (Chambersburg, Pa.), Nov. 16, 2000, at 3A.
129. Id.
130. Ed Treleven, Probationand FineforSex with Inmate, Wis. ST. J., Sept. 19, 2006, at
Cl.
131. Lisa Schuetz, Oakhill Prison's Handling of Problem Probed: Warden Is Said to Have
Waited Months to Report Allegations That Two Female Officers Had Sexual Contact
with Male Inmates, Wis. ST. J., April 4, 2006, at Al.
132. Bob Gardinier, Former GuardSentenced to 8 Years: David Rohrmiller Pleaded Guilty to
Charges Relating to Rapes of Inmates, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Nov. 9, 2006, at
B7.
133. Id.
134. Southeast Tennessee, CHATTANOOGA TIMEs FREE PREss, March 2, 2006, at B1.
135. Nancy Meersman, Ex-Prison Guard Can Appeal Rape Conviction, UNION LEADER
(Manchester, N.H.), May 25, 2005, at Al0.
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report sexual abuse, particularly abuse committed by female staff, out of
a desire to maintain their masculine image.'36 Additionally, the ingrained
nature of the gender stereotype can, in some cases, prohibit these men
from even identifying their experiences as abusive at the time they occur.' At the same time, male inmates who do recognize their
experiences as abusive often hesitate to report out of fears of being
doubted or mocked.' Moreover, because the gender stereotype paints
women as passive victims, women often become "nearly invisible as sexual criminal[s]" to the criminal justice system. 39 As a result, only
women involved in very serious sexual abuse cases are likely to be
charged and convicted." "For all these reasons-real and imaginedfemale sex offending is likely to go unrecognized, undiscovered and unreported.''.
III.

RETHINKING THE GENDER STEREOTYPE

In light of the Bureau's new data revealing the prevalence of female
staff perpetrators, the criminal justice system's leniency in prosecuting
female staff is clearly deficient. "To continue to pretend that women are
not capable of seducing or manipulating [men] to have sex, or to conclude that women who behave this way are too rare to merit attention,
will enslave us to the unfortunate habits and stereotypes of the past
. ... 142 The criminal justice system must actively question the gender
stereotype that lies at the heart of the current legal response to staff sexual misconduct, and develop a new standard for the prosecution of all
staff perpetrators. To construct the basis for such a standard, one must
first look to and learn lessons from the legal system's treatment of female
perpetrators of statutory rape outside of the prison context.
136. See supra note 25 (assessing the societal forces at work in perpetuating the gender
order both inside and outside of prison).
137. Levine, supra note 25, at 385 (discussing how men are just as constrained as women
by gender stereotypes and societal expectations when involved in sexually abusive
situations).
138. Id.; see Fuchs, supra note 25, at 94-96 (explaining how society ridicules men who
come forward to report assaults performed by women, particularly when the male victim admits to having maintained an erection during his sexual assault, and further
arguing that an erection under these circumstances should not be read as an indication of consent to engage in sexual activity).
139. Levine, supra note 25, at 384.
140. See id. at 383 (contending that the extent of female perpetrated sexual abuse is "potentially far more prevalent" than any statistics indicate).
141. Id. at 3 8 8 .
142. Id. at 359.
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A. LearningLessons fom the Courts' Treatment
ofFemale PerpetratorsofStatutory Rape
The traditional legal approach to statutory rape, much like the traditional approach to prison rape, generally failed to account for the
possibility that boys and men may become the victims of female rapists.
Instead, most historical state statutory rape laws and court decisions on
the issue reflected the pervasive gender stereotype that rape is a "masculine crime."14 In particular, the gender stereotype was evident in the
deveiopment and interpretation of state statutory rape laws that defined
statutory rape as non-consensual sexual intercourse with a female.'44 The
courts often interpreted these statutes as reflecting the physiological reality that only a male actor could force penetration, 14 and therefore a
woman could not rape a man. Consequently, the historical statutes and
case law in this regard mainly
served to protect young girls and women,
46
and to ignore male victims.1
143. Brooks v. State, 330 A.2d 670, 672 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975) (denying appellant's
equal protection challenge to Maryland's gender-specific rape statute on the basis that
rape must necessarily be defined as a "masculine crime" in order to protect vulnerable
women). "The equality of the sexes expresses a societal goal, not a physical metamorphosis. It would be anomalous indeed if our aspirations toward the ideal of equality
under the law caused us to overlook our disparate human vulnerabilities." Brooks, 330
A.2d at 672.
144. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2018 (1972) (specifying, in relevant part: "A person
commits statutory rape when he engages in sexual intercourse with any female under
the age of 14 years, not his spouse"); MINN. STAT. § 609.291 (1974) (providing, in
relevant part: "Whoever has sexual intercourse with a female person, not his wife,
without that person's consent and under any of the following circumstances, commits
aggravated rape and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 30 years").
The second-wave feminist movement that emerged in the 1970s worked hard to
transform every gender-specific rape statute in the United States into a gender-neutral
rape statute, and by the year 2000 they had attained that goal. See CAROLYN E.
COCCA, JAILBAIT: THE POLITICS OF STATUTORY RAPE LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES

22 (2004) ("The laws now read that 'any person' who has sex with 'any person' under
the age of consent has committed a criminal act.").
145. See Fuchs, supra note 25, at 110 ("Several state courts have gone as far as state that it
is physiologically impossible for a man to be raped."). See, e.g., Green v. State, 270
So. 2d 695 (Miss. 1972) (upholding the constitutionality of a gender-specific "Peeping Tom" statute by comparing it to other gender-specific statutes like the state's rape
statute, for which it provides a rationale: "One of the elements of rape is penetration,
... therefore, the crime of rape can only be committed by a male").
146. See, e.g., Hall v. State, 365 So. 2d 1249, 1253 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978) ("The State
has a vital interest in the protection of young girls from the animalistic instincts of
such men. It is the declared public policy of this State and in no wise runs afoul of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or any other constitutional provision."); see Levit, supra note 24, at 94 (exposing and analyzing the
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In the 1970s, the circuit courts debated the issue of whether gender-specific rape statutes should be expanded to cover both male and
female victims under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.'4 7 In 1981, the Supreme Court responded to this circuit
split with its decision in Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma
County.48 In this case, a minor male defendant accused of raping a minor female challenged California's statutory rape statute for unlawfully
discriminating on the basis of gender.'49 The statute defined statutory
rape as "an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female not the
wife of the perpetrator, where the female is under the age of 18 years,"
and, as a result, only imposed criminal sanctions on the male actor.'50
The State argued that its underlying objective in making a gender-based
classification in the statute was to prevent teenage pregnancies. The
Court upheld this objective as justified because women's ability to become pregnant is, in and of itself, "a significant deterrent for unwed
young females.''. Men, on the other hand,
5 2 are not deterred in the same
way and thus require statutory deterrence.
In the years after the Supreme Court decided Michael M, many
state courts continued to uphold the constitutionality of gender-specific
rape statutes. 153 At the same time, multiple state courts also departed
from the Supreme Court's holding by reinterpreting gender-specific
statutes as gender-neutral, thereby protecting the rights of both male
and female victims from sexual abuse. Three of the most well-known of
these non-conforming decisions are Ex parte Richard Groves,5 decided

perpetuation of the stereotype of male sexual aggression in the Supreme Court's decision in MichaelM. v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma County, which "fosters the belief that this

aggression is biologically based").
147. See Fuchs, supra note 25, at 108-110 (examining some cases on either side of the

circuit split).
148. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
149. MichaelM, 450 U.S. at 466.
150. MichaelM., 450 U.S. at 4 66.
151. MichaeliM, 450 U.S. at 480 (Stewart, J., concurring). This ruling received criticism
"for the way it stereotyped masculinity and male sexual violence." Fuchs, supra note

25, at 108.
152. MichaelM, 450 U.S. at 480 (Stewart, J., concurring).

153. See, e.g., Baynes v. State, 423 So. 2d 307 (Ala. 1982) (finding that the gender-specific
rape statute does not violate the Equal Protection Clause when the gender-based classification is reasonable and has a "fair and substantial relationship" with an interest of
the state legislature, such as the protection of young girls from pregnancy); State v.
LaMere, 655 P.2d 46, 50 (Idaho 1982) (upholding the constitutionality of the gender-specific rape statute because it serves the important governmental objective of
preventing illegitimate teenage pregnancies).

154. 571 S.W. 2d 888 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
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by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas in 1978, People v. Liberta,"'
decided by the Court of Appeals of New York in 1984, and Maine v.
Stevens,'56 decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in 1986.
In Ex parte Richard Groves, a male defendant challenged a Texas
statutory rape law on the basis that it unlawfully discriminated against
men.157 The statute made it a felony to engage in sexual intercourse with
a female under the age of seventeen other than one's wife, and defined
sexual intercourse as "any penetration of the female sex organ by the
male sex organ."15' The court determined that the legislature intended to
protect the rights of both male and female victims of rape.159 Accordingly, the court held that "although the male sex organ must penetrate
the female sex organ in order for sexual intercourse to occur, such penetration may be initiated and that result caused by action of the female as
well as the male."'' 60 Thus, the court reinterpreted the statute to include
female perpetrators and male victims.
In People v. Liberta, a male defendant challenged New York Penal
Law Section 130.35, which defined rape in the first degree as sexual intercourse with a female by "forcible compulsion."''
In considering the
exemption for females inherent in this statute, the court held that the
government's purpose in using a gender-based classification was not justified.162 Furthermore, the court refused to base its holding in the notion
that female rape victims face problems unique to their gender, calling it
"archaic and overbroad generalization which is evidently grounded in
long-standing
stereotypical notions of the differences between the
,,163
sexes.
Finally, in Maine v. Stevens, a female defendant charged with the
rape of a thirteen-year-old boy argued that the definition of sexual intercourse in the state statutory rape law implicated a male actor and female
victim and therefore could not be applied to her case.16 The statute defined statutory rape as sexual intercourse with any person under the age
of fourteen other than one's spouse, and defined "sexual intercourse" as
"any penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex organ.' ' 165 The
155. 474 N.E. 2d 567 (N.Y. 1984).

156. 510 A.2d 1070 (Me. 1986).
157. Groves, 571 S.W. 2d at 889.
158. Groves, 571 S.W. 2d at 889.
159. Groves, 571 S.W. 2d at 892.

160. Groves, 571 S.W. 2d at 892-93.
161. Liberta, 474 N.E. 2d at 577.
162. Liberta, 474 N.E. 2d at 573.

163. Liberta, 474 N.E. 2d at 573.
164. Stevens, 510 A.2d at 1071.

165. Stevens, 510 A.2d at 1071.
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court interpreted the statute as gender-neutral and therefore as encompassing victims and perpetrators of both sexes."' The court explained
that although the statute's definition of sexual intercourse "reflects the
biological reality" that sexual intercourse involves penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex organ, that definition does not limit the
identity of perpetrators of statutory rape to men."'
As these cases demonstrate, the criminal justice system has gradually become more willing to recognize male victims and female
perpetrators of statutory rape, and to thereby move beyond the gender
stereotype outside of the prison context. The courts are justified for
multiple reasons in turning to statutory rape law for guidance and inspiration in the development of a new standard to apply to perpetrators of
staff sexual misconduct in prisons. First, there is more jurisprudence in
the area of statutory rape, for the courts have thoroughly considered the
1 68
gender issues underlying these laws during the last twenty-five years.
Second, the statutory rape scenario is in many ways parallel to the
prison sexual violence scenario. For instance, in both situations, consent
is generally not a legal defense. Under statutory rape laws, minors are
legally unable to consent.1 69 Similarly, under twenty-three staff-oninmate sexual abuse statutes, as described earlier, consent is not a defense.1 70 Finally, the same gender stereotype is historically situated at the
root of the legal response to both issues, lending itself to a delayed, yet
growing, official recognition that female perpetrators can victimize boys

and men.171
166. Stevens, 510 A.2d at 1071.
167. Stevens, 510A.2d at 1071 n.2.
168. See CoccA, supra note 144, at 67 (considering the extensive "judicial attention" that
has been paid to the gender-specific language in statutory rape laws from the 1970s to
the present).
169. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5(a) (2007) (defining the age of valid consent for
sexual intercourse as eighteen, unless the minor is married to the defendant); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-3502 (2005) (criminalizing sexual intercourse with minors under the age of
fourteen); OR. Rav. STAT. § 163.315 (2003) (characterizing people under the age of
eighteen as incapable of validly consenting to sexual acts). See generally THE LEWIN
GROUP, STATUTORY RAPE: A GUIDE TO STATE LAWS AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

(2004), availableat http://opa.osophs.dhhs.gov/tidex/statutory%20rapestate%201aws
lewin.pdf (summarizing the state statutory rape laws in the United States in 2004).
170. See supra Part I.A. (outlining the components of state statutory laws criminalizing
staff sexual misconduct).
171. See Susanne V. Paczensky, The Wall of Silence: Prison Rape and Feminist Politics, in
PRISON MASCULINITIES 133, 135-36 (Don Sabo et al. eds., 2001) (viewing the growing acceptance of male victims of child abuse as only the first step: "The next step will
have to include adult males and their victimization"); Ken Tennen, Wake Up,
Maggie: GenderNeutral Statutory Rape Laws, Third-PartyInfant-Blood Extraction, and
the Conclusive Presumption of Legitimacy, 18 J. Juv. L. 1, 1 (1997) (describing the
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B. The New Standard
Taking into account the alternative perspectives and language from
the three cases above, this Article proposes a new standard to prosecute
both female and male staff perpetrators of prison rape. Already, many
jurisdictions are beginning to expand and improve their "comprehensive
strategies for preventing and responding appropriately to [staff] sexual
misconduct. ' 172 These strategies include passing more stringent laws that
exclude consent as a defense, implementing new agency policies to prevent and respond to staff sexual misconduct, and instituting training
1 73
programs to spread both staff and inmate awareness of the problem.
However, the legal system must continue to improve its response to staff
sexual misconduct.
Above all, the legal system must actively question the gender stereotype motivating current responses to staff sexual misconduct in prisons.
The gender-neutral transition that has occurred in the statutory rape
context must occur in the staff sexual misconduct context. As described
above, the legal system initially failed to account for the existence of
male victims and female perpetrators of statutory rape. However, it
gradually realized the inaccuracy inherent in this approach.1 74 Likewise,
the legal system must acknowledge the presence of male inmate victims
and female staff perpetrators of sexual misconduct in prisons, and generate a more gender-neutral framework with which to prosecute all staff
sexual misconduct. The gender-neutral language in state and federal
criminal statutes regarding staff sexual misconduct is not enough. These
7
laws must be applied consistently to male and female perpetrators.1 1

172.

173.
174.
175.

growing official recognition of both female sex offenders and male victims in the
statutory rape context).
SEXUAL MISCONDUCT IN PRISONS, supra note 38, at 1 (praising the progress made in
the late 1990s in recognizing the magnitude of sexual misconduct in prisons and the
resulting efforts taken by many jurisdictions to combat it). For example, the Virginia
Department of Corrections (DOC) developed a pamphlet on staff sexual misconduct
to give to inmates when they first arrive. Id. at 10. The California DOC presented
draft legislation to the state legislature proposing enhanced penalties for staff sexual
misconduct. Id. at 4. And the Alaska DOC hired new staff members "dedicated to
review, advice, and investigation of all incidents involving staff misconduct." Id. at 7.
Several other jurisdictions have taken similar steps. Id. at 7-10.
See id.
See supra Part III.A. (delineating the historical shifts in the courts' approach to male
and female perpetrators of statutory rape).
See, e.g., supra Part II.C. (providing some evidence of the disparate prosecution and
sentencing of female and male perpetrators of staff sexual misconduct under otherwise gender-neutral criminal statutes).
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Generating a truly gender-neutral approach first requires the active
prosecution of all those accused of staff sexual misconduct, regardless of
gender.1 76 Improving reporting systems in correctional facilities will allow all inmate victims to easily and safely voice their experiences of
prison sexual violence. 77 This will bring to light more situations that
warrant prosecution. Another method of promoting prosecution is to
universally eliminate consent as a legal defense to these prosecutions.
Interactions between prison staff and inmates are so laden with unequal
power dynamics that any attempts to distinguish between freely given
consent and coerced consent (either direct or indirect) prove futile and
detract from prosecutorial efforts .
Second, law enforcement must impose enhanced penalties on all
those convicted of staff sexual misconduct, regardless of gender. It is unacceptable that three states and the federal government continue to
7
define some forms of staff sexual misconduct as misdemeanor crimes.1 1
Lawmakers should consider acts of staff sexual misconduct to constitute
felonies that can carry penalties including incarceration, heavy fines, loss
of license, and registration in the state Sex Offender database.8 0 Enhanced penalties in all state and federal statutes would not only be
appropriate punishments for the crime, but would also provide necessary deterrence to both female and male staff members. 8 ' The OIG
report released in April 2005 emphasizes the persistent need for
176. See ALL Too FAMILIAR, supra note 77 ("In Human Rights Watch's view, any correctional employee who engages in sexual intercourse or sexual touching with a prisoner
is guilty of a crime and should be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.").
177. See STAFF PERSPECTIVES, supra note 7, at 21 (gathering recommendations from focus
groups comprised of prison officials in order to "improve the correctional response to
sexual violence"); Martin F. Horn, Testimony (Question and Answer) at the
National Prison Rape Elimination Commission Hearing: Elimination of Prison Rape:
The Corrections Perspective (Mar. 23, 2006), available at http://www.nprec.us/ proceedings-miami.htm (calling for the implementation of additional reporting
mechanisms for inmates, including confidential outlets).
178. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text (reflecting on the complex power
struggles between staff and inmates that can come into play in their sexual encounters).
179. See supra notes 33-35 (outlining the state and federal statutory penalties for staff
sexual misconduct).
180. See CorrectionalandJuvenile Facilities-Contactwith Inmates andJuveniles-Penalties:
Hearingon H.B. 456 Before the H. JudicialProceedings Comm., 4 21st Gen. Ass., Reg.
Sess., at 4 (Md. 2006) (testimony of Brenda V. Smith) (on file with the American
University Law Review) [hereinafter Smith Testimony] (urging the Committee to
strengthen the criminal penalties in Maryland for staff sexual misconduct from misdemeanor to felony penalties).
181. See DETERRING STAFF SEXUA. ABUSE, supra note 20, at 11 ("While administrative
actions, including termination, may seem substantial, these punishment often do not
provide sufficient deterrence to staff sexual abuse of inmates.").
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strengthened deterrence efforts in light of the fact that "prison staff who
sexually abuse inmates often do not believe that they will be caught, and
if they are caught do not believe they will be punished., 182 Studies show
that prosecutors are more interested in prosecuting sexual abuse cases
when the charged crimes are felonies. 83 Thus, increasing penalties for
staff sexual misconduct, along with active prosecution of all offenders,
will better protect inmate victims and deter future staff sexual misconduct.
CONCLUSION

In order to detect, prevent, reduce, and punish prison rape, and to
protect inmates' constitutional rights,1 84 the legal system must acknowledge that female staff can and do perpetrate sexual misconduct in
prisons. Applying the new standard that this Article proposes will be a
sizable step in that direction. This standard consists of the active prosecution of both male and female staff for sexual misconduct and the
imposition of harsher penalties on all those convicted.
This standard will dissolve the stereotype regarding male perpetrators and female victims by recognizing the existence of female staff
perpetrators and prosecuting them just as harshly as male staff perpetrators. In addition, by adding to deterrence efforts, the standard will
reduce the overall incidence of staff-on-inmate sexual misconduct. The
standard will also assist in breaking down the code of silence in prisons
by normalizing male victims' experiences. As a result, reporting on such
misconduct will increase, and the reliability of data on the numbers and
identities of victims and perpetrators will improve.185
Conversely, failure by lawmakers and the courts to adequately
respond to staff sexual misconduct will have severe consequences for
inmates and the prison system in general. Allowing staff sexual
182. Id. at 11-12. Some state prisons and correctional agencies have made their own efforts to implement deterrence programs and spread awareness about the detrimental
effects of staff sexual misconduct. See SEXUAL MISCONDUCT IN PRISONS, supra note
38, at 1 (describing state-wide initiatives, such as policy seminars, training workshops, and research, to reduce sexual misconduct between staff and inmates); Wake,
supra note 41, at 220 (describing the training program for staff instituted by the NIC
to address staff-on-inmate sexual abuse).
183. DETERRING STAFF SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 20, at 1; see Smith Testimony, supra
note 180, at 4-5 (emphasizing that enhanced penalties for staff sexual misconduct
will encourage prosecution efforts).
184. See 42 U.S.C. § 15602 (Supp. IV 2004) (listing the PREA's core goals).
185. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text (weighing the causes and effects of the
prison code of silence on the reliability of reporting).

MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW

[Vol. 14:259

misconduct to persist behind prison walls can, for instance, jeopardize
prison security,"' create an environment lacking in "mutual respect"
between staff and inmates,'87 endanger the public health, 88 and violate
inmates' constitutional rights. "As a society, we have chosen
incarceration as a primary tool to deal with antisocial behavior. Having
made this choice, we are legally and morally responsible for protecting
those who become wards of the state."' 89 t

186. See Elizabeth Layman et. al., The Center for Innovative Public Policies, Exploding the
Myths about Staff Sexual Misconduct with Inmates: Risk Assessment, Prevention and Investigation, http://www.cipp.org/sexual/jailsex.html (outlining the harmful impacts of
staff sexual misconduct on correctional organizations).

187.

COMMISSION ON SAFETY AND ABUSE IN AMERICA'S PRISONS, CONFRONTING

CON-

66 (2006) (encouraging prison officials to create a "culture of mutual
respect" in their prisons in order to maintain security and control over inmates, and
thereby reduce prison violence).
188. See generally Christopher P. Krebs, High-Risk HIV Transmission Behavior in Prison
and the Prison Subculture, 82 PRISON J. 19 (2002); Esteban Parra & Lee Williams,
AIDS Epidemic Raging Behind Bars: Newark AIDS Specialist Calls Care of Inmates 'A
Disgrace, DEL. ONLINE, Sept. 26, 2005, http://www.delawareonline.com/apps/
pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20050926/NEWS/509260347/1006&theme=PRISONDEAT
HS (describing the severe problem of the spread of AIDS in prisons, which can extend to the outside community when prisoners are released).
189. Julie Samia Mair et al., National Challenges in Population Health: New Hopefor Victims ofPrison SexualAssault, 31 J.L. MED & ETHICS 602, 605 (2003).
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